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Introduction 
 
In the midstream of decolonization 
 
Коней на переправе не меняют.1 
-Russian proverb 
 
We are in a period of major changes and difficult processes in Eastern Europe since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and in South Asia since the exit of the British Empire. 
Kashmiris were promised a plebiscite in 19472 but have been waiting ever since; fast forward 
sixty-seven years to April of 20143 when separatists in Eastern Ukraine declared sovereignty of 
the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic through a referendum 
rejected by the greater part of the world. 1947 and 2014 were integral years for Kashmir and 
Ukraine respectively: the ascension of Kashmir to India and the Maidan revolution in Ukraine 
changed the political destiny of these regions. In response to Kashmir’s ascension, a war between 
Pakistan and India broke out over the future of the region. Ukraine declared the Anti-Terrorist 
Operation (ATO) in Eastern Ukraine, sparking a violent conflict with support from outside actors 
(most notably Russia).  
Both of these regions have entered the global conversation because of the violence that 
exploded in their formative years – Kashmir in the last century and Ukraine in this one. Conflict 
arises from complex and protracted issues that cannot be boiled down to a simple sentence, these 
issues move beyond any single school of thought or framing. Question a separatist from Donetsk, 
an insurgent in Kashmir, or the official governments in Kiev and New Delhi on why they fight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Translated as: Don't swap horses when crossing the stream. A Russian proverb warning not to 
make major changes in the middle of a difficult process.  
2 "Plebiscite in Kashmir," Kashmir Library, accessed April 18, 2015, 
http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_chapters/plebiscite.shtml. 
3 Iryna Havdiak and Artur Inderike, "Timeline," in The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and 
Foreign Intervention, ed. Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2014), 478-480. 
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and what they want from such conflict, and the answers received will vary drastically. These 
multilayered, multifaceted clashes cannot and will not be solved in a day, but the question 
remains of how we can even begin to work towards a solution given the chaos.  
 This project was inspired partly from my own questioning of identity as a first generation 
American. Upon my birth, I was conferred the privilege of the American citizenship, of being a 
New Yorker. Had I been born in Ukraine, I would have been Ukrainian – an identity complicated 
by being from a Western Ukrainian city. My parents were once citizens of the Soviet Union, 
their parents Romanian, and the past generations Austro-Hungarian. We did not move – the 
borders did; does identity shift because of the flag that flies over our heads? Who we are, is one 
of the most fundamental questions anyone can ask whether in political thought or philosophical 
inquiry. The question remains a theoretical issue until we introduce the idea that identity resides 
in a space outside of self-identification: once political processes and realities are introduced, 
identity becomes something else entirely. We begin to identify by nationalities, language, 
religion – these identities come together to form communities, which in turn form polities. The 
question may be simple: members of a Kashmiri Muslim community could form a polity, just as 
much as members of a Ukrainian Orthodox Christian community. These states would operate as 
the national homes for these communities, but neither history nor contemporary politics work out 
that way.  
Enter colonization, compromised identities, mixed identities, and the rise of multi-ethnic 
empires and nation-states aimed at modernizing and folding in the periphery – the story then 
became muddled. Fast forward to the rise of decolonization, a messy and sticky process that 
created new states charged with building a new national identity and institutions to make sure the 
fledgling nation does not slide backwards into subservience – but in the advent of new states, 
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centuries-old identity crises were suppressed and swept under the rug. These unresolved conflicts 
resulted in entire groups of people becoming disenfranchised by the very nations that declared 
their freedom in the name of forming one cohesive national narrative. The true mess began here, 
as the problematic side effects of decolonization and compromised identities boiled into conflicts 
and confrontations. On one side, marginalized groups with varying goals formed to fight against 
the postcolonial state, and on the other, the nation-states themselves fight to form and maintain a 
powerful, functional, and cohesive state.  
Kashmir within India and Novorossiya4 within Ukraine offers us an a story and reality to 
consider and learn about some of the greater issues at play in the process of decolonization, 
where a chunk of time has passed since the independence of the United Kingdom’s colonies and 
only recently did the countries of the Soviet Union attain their sovereignty. This temporal aspect 
allows us to trace a history in one conflict while comparing to developments in the other as they 
happen in real-time. Comparisons, however, are not so simple: does Ukraine really have similar 
issues to Kashmir and India? A major contextualization must occur in order to bring Ukrainian 
and Indian realities into the same playing field for comparison: pierogies are simply not the same 
thing as samosas. Once these issues are historicized and contextualized, it may be possible to 
draw lessons from one conflict in order to frame and understand newer issues. I will work to 
consider Kashmir as a formative issue for challenging decolonization and compromised 
identities, whose lessons can then be applied to newer conflicts that are only just taking shape.  
Methodology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Novorossiya, or New Russia, is a historical term referring to a large part of Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine, including the major cities of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Odessa. This 
paper uses Novorossiya as a term to describe Russia’s influence in this region. 
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 This project seeks to understand the connection between challenged decolonization, 
compromised identities, and postcolonial conflict zones. For the purposes of this project, 
challenged decolonization describes the difficulty of defining the “postcolonial nation,” where 
many problems that have their roots during colonialism have yet to be addressed, let alone 
solved. Challenged decolonization reaches beyond the political side of decolonization, where the 
colonial power officially withdraws its claim and a sovereign nation is born. Instead, challenged 
decolonization focuses on the next phase of challenges, moving out from the meeting chambers 
of parliaments and voting booths of referendums to the reality on the streets: this face of 
decolonization is contested, disputed, and challenged. We have not realized decolonization, nor 
do we fully grasp what an “end point” would look like.  
It is here in the real world that the concept of compromised identities fits in – nationalism 
and identity politics is a particular problem for decolonization and the formation of states. John 
Plamenatz speaks of nationalism as “primarily a cultural phenomenon, although it often takes a 
political form.” Of note is the “eastern” form of nationalism formed in Eastern Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America – the postcolonial world. Eastern nationalism has formed among 
“peoples recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose cultures are not 
adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards.” 
Partha Chatterjee comments on the liberal dilemma this causes: on one hand, the rise of 
independent states is framed as something good and necessary, but the nationalism that is behind 
such movements is viewed negatively.5 Chatterjee created a derivative discourse – these issues 
cannot be reduced to a problem of East versus West; nor is it particularly helpful to promote this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 1-5. 
	   5 
divide. This project does not seek to consider such divisions, but rather to form a narrative of 
decolonization in order to formulate lessons and create a basis for comparison.  
Nationalism and liberal statehood6, then, are at odds with each other. The non-western 
world, therefore, has the difficult task of finding a way to marry its different nationalities under a 
liberal state. This problem is particularly pronounced in the formation of India, which began to 
frame itself as a liberal, secular, and multiethnic state while underscoring its foundation as a 
homeland for Hindus. Ukraine, subsequently, inherited different forms of nationalism based on 
language, religion, and regional affiliation. These different forms of nationalism, however, 
manifest themselves in the identity politics seen on the ground, steeped in history and the 
complications associated with changing tides and dominant colonialism. Both India and Ukraine, 
however, experienced an interesting form of nationalism that can be defined as official 
nationalism, according to Chatterjee. This form of “official nationalism” results in an official 
cultural homogeneity from the top7 – this is seen in the Hindu underpinnings in Indian politics to 
the heavy Russification of Ukrainian society.   
Nationalism combined with challenged decolonization has the potential for instability – a 
word of choice to describe the “unfavorable conditions so widespread throughout the formal 
colonial world8.” Raymond F. Betts posits that decolonized nations inherited a reality they were 
not prepared to handle, “they were ill prepared for the onrush of problems from without and 
constrained by the colonial structures and institutions found within.9” Both Kashmir and Ukraine 
were once part of a greater empire that had the ability to control entire strata of political, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Liberal statehood is framed as the modern idea of states with borders, international recognition, 
and even having the legal right to use force.  
7 Ibid, 20.  
8 Raymond Betts, Decolonization, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 62. 
9 Ibid. 
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economic, and social life. Each had to contend with the question and problems of sovereignty, 
whether through the unilateral choice to enter a union or a referendum that declared 
independence. Under empire, identity can be ignored or suppressed – but once these issues begin 
to simmer, decolonized states find themselves scrambling to try and handle growing unrest that 
has a high probability of transitioning to violence and conflict.  
This project is primarily comparative, looking at the issues present in both Eastern 
Ukraine and Kashmir in order to find common ground and lessons that can be drawn as steps 
further into solving the problem of challenged decolonization and compromised identities when 
violence erupts. Kashmir is first and foremost used as a historical precedent and seen as a region 
where the process of decolonization was confronted, giving a sort of launching point for the 
current situation in Ukraine, specifically in Eastern Ukraine. For the purposes of this project, 
there is a large focus on Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, as the issue of identity vis-à-
vis postcolonial national politics is most pronounced. The case of Ukraine is taken to include 
only Donetsk and Lugansk, while mentioning the issue of the Crimean peninsula. Because of 
Crimea’s complex history as a territory of Ukraine and its current status under de facto Russian 
control, political violence is not in the foremost issue. This project seeks to understand how 
challenged decolonization and compromised identities lead to political violence, and whether we 
can use historical cases as lessons for emerging problems.  
Chapter summaries 
 This project is separated into three chapters dedicated to explaining and drawing lessons 
from Kashmir and Ukraine. The first chapter looks at the Kashmiri conflict, explaining its 
emergence through a historical narrative while paying close attention to how identity and 
political realities inform the present situation in Kashmir. The first chapter sets up the story by 
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contextualizing Kashmir within its political situation: the local reality within Kashmir, Kashmir 
vis-à-vis India, and the international conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of 
Kashmir. The chapter begins by defining Kashmir’s status during the British Raj as an 
autonomous although subservient kingdom before moving to contemporary politics. Kashmir’s 
history at that period can be indicative of why the region remains problematic – as the decisions 
of Kashmiri rulers largely ignored the reality on the ground and allowed for British control and 
manipulation beyond the autonomous agreement. Next, the chapter moves to the problem of state 
building and fragility as a potential driver in the sparking of the Kashmiri conflict after the 
British Raj, including the circumstances of Kashmir’s ascension into India over Pakistan or 
independence. This chapter then outlines a cause and effect relationship of colonialism, 
challenged decolonization, compromised identities, and conflict as seen in Kashmir by looking at 
the identity politics at play in the region. The chapter concludes by questioning the Kashmiri 
conflict and India’s role as a defender – do Kashmiris, and postcolonial lives by extension – 
actually matter to the state, or is it part of the greater issue of India’s attempts at securing the 
state and national sovereignty?  
 The second chapter picks up this question by contextualizing and explaining the 
Ukrainian question in order to bring it to a comparable level to Kashmir. The chapter connects 
Soviet rule over Ukraine to the kind of relationship evident in the colonial world as a driving 
force for the subsequent issue of challenged decolonization and compromised identity issues in 
the 1990s. The chapter, however, dives deeper into the past than the Soviet Union, exploring the 
very formation of the Ukrainian national identity and the long history of suppression and 
liberation of the lands that will come to make up today’s Ukraine. The issue of Ukraine’s name is 
explained and expanded upon to define the relationship of Ukraine to Russia, the major political 
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player in the region. If following the logic of Kashmir, Ukraine’s problems trace back to these 
issues, where the modern nation-state must contend with this historical past and successor states 
that hold similar colonial powers over these regions. The compromised identities in Ukraine are 
then looked at and explained as they pertain to the national question, leading to today’s issues 
that are best explained as an identity crisis spilling into violence.  
 The final chapter brings Kashmir and Ukraine into a comparative perspective, finding 
common themes between the two and focusing on how the present situation in Ukraine can be 
reminiscent of Kashmir’s past in an attempt to draw parallels and tease out greater lessons and 
takeaway points. This chapter first looks at the current political reality of Kashmir in a way that 
can be comparable and seen from different angles and applied to other regions. Primarily, it is 
the problem of both the Kashmiri and the Indian states’ inability to form a cohesive identity that 
fits the historical narrative while working with the present issues in the face of decolonization. 
The chapter then moves to look at the current Ukrainian crisis stemming from the Maidan 
revolution of 2014 by introducing one of the major lessons from Kashmir: the problem of 
boundaries and state-building in regions where there is no single national identity that can be all-
encompassing without creating one for the single purpose of unity. Next, the chapter introduces 
the idea of the Postcolonial Informal Empire and the problem of living on the periphery, 
something common between both Kashmir and Ukraine. The two have found themselves in the 
borderlands of nations that inherited the power of the former colonial empires – and have begun 
to act in a way reminiscent of those same empires they gained independence from.  
 This project seeks to not only understand the complex relationship between 
decolonization and identity, but also try to find a means for framing and understanding the 
conflicts that arise from such problems. The political reality of both Kashmir and Ukraine stems 
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from a difficult history and an even more complex transition from colonial dominance to 
sovereignty. Although an antidote to solve these problems does not currently exist, we can begin 
by using some of the ideas that will be brought up by this research project as a point of 
























“For more than 50 years, India and Pakistan have been arguing and periodically coming to blows 
over one of the most beautiful places in the world, Kashmir, which the Moghul emperors thought 
of as Paradise on earth. As a result of unending quarrel, Paradise has been partitioned, 
impoverished and made violent.” 
Salman Rushdie, Kashmir, the Imperiled Paradise 
How did Kashmir get here?  
Colonialism has left a lasting impact on the global system – the process of creating new 
borders, confronting uncomfortable pasts, dealing with often compromised identity politics, and 
the drive for independence continues to shape the political realities and regimes of the world. 
Decolonization has not yet been realized, as observed with the persistence of frozen conflicts in 
the postcolonial world. The process itself may never be realized, as the question of what it means 
to be decolonized has yet to be answered – framing the issue as somehow realizable assumes that 
there is a right way to decolonize. The international community tried to grapple with the problem 
of foundling states, created from disintegrating empires – “Third Worldism” was born from these 
ashes to approach the unique problems the new nations face as a result of colonialism. Scholarly 
research began to realize that postcolonial nations were not simply created, that a process both 
messy and seemingly never-ending was created by colonization. This intersection of 
decolonization of governance and decolonization of the human element creates an exceedingly 
complicated and charged conflict: the drawing of borders and defining of nationalities by the 
colonial powers created compromised identities and violence. On one hand, there is 
decolonization on the state level: new institutions, defined borders, the creation of laws, and the 
creation of a political process without a colonial power. On the other, these fledgling institutions 
are charged with the job to create a national identity: what does it mean to be a citizen, who is a 
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citizen, and contending with identities that are already in existence. Decolonization, at its core, is 
the creation of a new foundation for states in a power vacuum left by the colonial powers. This is 
easier said than done, as proved by the countless problem regions which defy normative notions 
of the nation-state and what it means to be truly sovereign. The process could have an end, but 
that conclusion may not be something we necessarily like: Kashmir is one particular case that 
transcends history and has yet to come close to any sort of lasting resolution10.  
The presence of frozen conflicts and decolonized, complicated regions is an issue of not 
only regional importance but also crucial in the international sphere: these issues are played out 
in the streets and in the halls of the United Nations, in congressional palaces and presidential 
offices. Decolonization and its sparking of problematic, frozen conflicts transcends artificially 
drawn borders. Kashmir is an example where there is a transcendence of borders due to four 
distinct dimensions: provincial-level conflicts within Kashmir, the national-level politics 
between India and Kashmir, a larger regional confrontation between Pakistan and India over 
Kashmir’s sovereignty, and the international consequences of Kashmir. The process of 
decolonization of the British Empire in South Asia has caused a multi-faceted situation in 
Kashmir where there are levels of compromised identities and motivations. This proves to be a 
learning point for other regions with similar histories of colonization and the messy process of 
undoing years of colonial rule through decolonization.  
The conflict in Kashmir can be traced to the messy partition of British India in 1947. The 
reality of colonial rule in South Asia was that the British did not have direct control of the whole 
territory, but their colonization practices were felt even in the independence of the princely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Sing, Waheguru Pal. "Introduction." In Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, edited by 
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii, 117. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006 
	   12 
states. In addition to the regions governed directly by British rule, there were small autonomous 
states ruled by hereditary rulers: these kingdoms, formed after the Mughal Empire, were able to 
function relatively independently if they pledged their allegiance to the British Empire. Scholarly 
work tends to agree that these states had their roots in pre-colonial rule, but their persistence and 
even flourishing was due to the negotiation of treaties between these elites and the new 
colonizing British. Kashmir was one such kingdom, steeped in ancient history and traditions – 
the princes of India, to legitimate their rule over respective lands, made agreements with the 
British East India Company for mutual economic and military aid11. Kashmiri elites in particular 
had motives to cooperate with the British – during the Anglo-Sikh wars in the early nineteenth 
century; Gulab Singh (one of three brothers ruling over the majority of Jammu and Kashmir, 
then a vassal to the Sikh rulers) began to increasingly side with the British over the Sikh rulers. 
The British East India Company – pleased by the support they received from Singh during their 
conquests in the Punjab – rewarded Singh with the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh, 
thus defining the borders Jammu and Kashmir and setting the stage for future conflict during the 
Partition period12. This, however, was not the end for the colonial presence of the British in 
Kashmir; although the prince of Kashmir officially ruled the state, the British saw economic 
prospects in the region. The British instituted control over “the political and economic 
administration of the state by posting their officials. In fact, after setting up the residency in 
1885, the British directly intervened in the running of the affairs of the princely state.13” The 
British began to set up their own land revenue systems, restructuring preexisting frameworks – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 "People, princes and colonialism," introduction to India's Princely States: People, Princes and 
Colonialism, ed. Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), 5-7. 
12 Shakti Kak, "The Agrarian System of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir," in India's 
Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism, ed. Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati 
(London, UK: Routledge, 2007), 69. 
13 Ibid, 81. 
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they retained traditional appointments of Kashmiri jagirs (land owners) but began to pick their 
own. These changes meant that there were landowners who were loyal to both Kashmir and to 
the British, creating new elites in the region based off of the traditional framework. The British 
then instituted a new assessment system for the land, including “occupancy rights, period of 
lease, payment of revenue in cash, and the institutional structure to collect taxes.14” These 
structures then played a role in helping perpetuate famines and food shortages, as the residency 
of the British government in Kashmir continually dissuaded the maharajah from purchasing 
grains to distribute to citizens. Britain’s informal rule over Kashmir aided in the drawing of the 
region’s borders and instituting of policies detrimental to the Kashmiris themselves to restructure 
the society became hallmarks of colonial Kashmir and decolonization process that tried to 
address these colonial practices.   
Foundation of a new princely state created an interesting problem to come for the 
international community. Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh each had different demographics: 
Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists were a plurality in each region respectively, creating a state 
where each people were now under a single flag. This would become the precept for the future of 
Kashmir: the creation of a state where the new borders encompassed different ethnicities would 
soon become compromised.  
Decolonization creates the issue of fragility in a region, where its foundations are faulty 
from the start: this distinctive type of statehood includes within its definition an inability for the 
state to provide basic services. This is felt on multiple levels, including the larger state and eve 
on the regional level. The interplay between the consequences of decolonization on the state 
level – India – and on the regional level – Kashmir – is important to consider in order to fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid.	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understand how each functions and plays off the other. Regional politics can oftentimes be very 
different than the state-level, but other times there is also a mirroring. This relationship is 
important to consider in learning lessons from conflict zones. On the government level, the 
postcolonial fragile state has an inefficient and corrupt institutional structure. Furthermore, the 
government cannot function based on rule of law, undermining its legitimacy through coercion. 
Economically speaking, the fragile state lacks any sort of national economy capable of sustaining 
a basic level of welfare and resource management. The fragile state must rely on the globalized 
economy and external interests, such as non-governmental organizations or foreign direct 
investment. The fragile state cannot provide its citizens many basic citizenship rights, partially 
due to a divided population based on ethnic backgrounds. This category of states has not fostered 
a community as a primary bond among its people at the national level15. Together, these common 
attributes of fragile states provide a beginning framework to work with when looking at 
emerging threats to state stability.  
There is, however, an added dimension common among fragile states and destabilizing 
conflicts: a major questioning of identity and allegiances as they relate to the greater national 
framework of identity. Among other issues common across the postcolonial world, identity 
proves to be a “zero-sum game,16” and an irreconcilable sticking point. On one end is the state’s 
own identity framework and on the other end, an alternate identity at odds with state goals. 
Regions that are within fragile states, created by challenged decolonization, must contend with 
issues of identity that act as further destabilizing factors in an already messy situation. Identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Lothar Brock et al., Fragile States: Violence and the Future of Intervention (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2012), 21. 
16 David Kang, "Acute Conflicts in Asia after the Cold War," in Asian Security Order: 
Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 367. 
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readily connects fragile statehood with violent conflict – “many observes have claimed that the 
violence characterizing the ‘new wars’ in fragile states derives from the politics of identity17.” 
The caveat, however, is that “…It happens only when political entrepreneurs employ cultural 
identities to sort out friend and foe, and mobile groups into turning against one another in a 
process of escalating conflict18.” Such issues have been observed around the world in the post-
Cold War era. Identity politics fuse together aspects of fragile statehood with intrastate violence, 
common among many in this class of states in the international community.  
Kashmir: South Asia’s powder keg 
This chapter will contextualize Kashmir as a product of the lengthy process of 
decolonization: if the conclusion is that the end result of decolonization is an unrealized state 
where frozen conflict rules, we can look at nations in the early stages of decolonization and make 
meaningful predictions about the future while examining ways to make a state with sturdy 
foundations a reachable goal for decolonization. Jammu and Kashmir proves to be an interesting 
case study to view the intersection between decolonized states, the sparking of subnational 
conflict, and compromised identity politics. Fragile sub-national entities often comprise a large 
part of the destabilizing factors in the overall fragility of a nation, following a modern trend 
towards intrastate conflict rather than interstate wars. Kashmir is also a region where there is a 
long-standing conflict between the powers which lay claim to the territory: Kashmir is both a 
historical case and a modern phenomenon. The case of Kashmir will be examined in a present-
past: it will be studied historically while paying attention to the fact that it remains a very real 
problem in South Asian politics. This will give us a greater understanding of how decolonization, 
identity, and the foundations of state intermingle and give us tools for understanding emerging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Brock et al., Fragile States: Violence and the Future, 48-49. 
18 Ibid. 
	   16 
conflicts in different parts of the world. Before diving into the question of Kashmir’s status in the 
greater international community and its role in the decolonization narrative, the roots of the 
Kashmir issue must be examined. The long, tumultuous history can be divided into three 
overarching themes which add fuel to the conflict between India and Pakistan: the geographical 
importance of Kashmir, the question of a Kashmiriyat identity, and the political rhetoric along 
with the actions employed by both Pakistan and India when talking about the disputed region to 
draw out differences in identity and to mobilize communities to act. In the end, this chapter will 
discuss how postcolonial governments handle these problematic regions through military and 
political processes, exacerbating the overall issue of challenged decolonization. Kashmir is 
important to examine in the international community because it has, since the partition of British 
India in 1947, been at the center of three wars between India and Pakistan. Both Pakistan and 
India have access to nuclear weapons and have exercised their power to test them as the conflict 
escalated over the allegiance of the region. “The region not only has witnessed the most 
sustained level of violence anywhere in the world since the Cold War but is recognized as a 
crisis-prone nuclear flashpoint19.” Kashmir itself plays an integral role in the international 
community, providing a heated point for debate on the intersection of decolonization and the 
importance of considering compromised identities in the creation of new states, the overall issues 
of faulty foundations, and in the greater considerations of how the world can respond to the Indo-
Pakistani dispute over the region while maintaining modern definitions of successful statehood.  
The modern region known commonly as Kashmir was, at the time of the partition of 
British India, a princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This state occupies three distinct regions, 
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each with a deep-rooted history, a religious, and ethnic identity: the Hindu-majority Jammu, the 
Muslim-majority Kashmir, and the Buddhist-majority Ladakh. These geographic demarcations 
along identity lines are important for the overall story of fragility, violence, identity, and overall 
decolonization. The origins of the Kashmiri conflict lie in the history Jammu and Kashmir itself. 
The British prime minister, Clement Atlee, during the period of partition declared, “His 
majesty’s government does not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under 
paramountcy to any government of British India20.” The hope among the fifty-six princely states 
that enjoyed autonomy in British India was that independence was within reach. This idea then 
evolved to a second declaration, “all the states will in due course find their appropriate place 
with one or the other domination within the British Commonwealth21.” The power to choose 
seemed to stay in the hands of the princely states, but with a heavy handed nudge from either the 
forming India or Pakistan, making it all but a requirement to join one of the two. Most states, by 
the end of partition, joined the new Indian union or Pakistan, based in part on ethnic lines: 
Muslim-majority to Pakistan and Hindu-majority to India. Kashmir, however, stayed in a state of 
flux due to a series of events surrounding the Hindu Maharajah who ruled the princely state at 
the time of partition in 1947 and the political motivations of the newly created Indian and 
Pakistani leaders.  
 Maharajah Hari Singh was not particularly eager to join either India or Pakistan, despite a 
Muslim-majority population and the maharajah’s own Hindu identity. This changed, however, 
when infiltrators and tribesmen from Pakistan attempted to overthrow Hari Singh to force 
Kashmir to ascend to Pakistan, prompting the First Kashmir War in 1948. In August of 1947, 
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Mohamed Ibrahim Khan, the founder and leader of Azad Kashmir (fighting for Kashmiri 
ascension to Pakistan) contacted tribesmen in Pakistan to overthrow the Maharajah. Kashmir’s 
geographical location made the choice between India and Pakistan a particularly sore point for 
the two fledgling nations. Kashmir finds itself in the middle of two coalescing nations along with 
a varying religious identity, representative of both the new nations: Muslims for Pakistan and 
Hindus for India. At the time of partition, Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim-majority (75 
percent) population that was concentrated in the sub-region of Kashmir while Jammu and 
Ladakh had a different religious plurality. Pakistan’s insurrection into Kashmir and their 
approach to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, prompted the Maharajah to seek direct military aid 
from India with the blessing of the leader of the National Conference in Kashmir, Sheikh 
Abdullah, which in return demanded ascension to their union. On October 27th, 1947, the Indian 
military officially intervened. This sparked a United Nations intervention, promise of plebiscite 
for the people to choose between India and Pakistan, and a path of conflict and war for the two 
nations and the region of Kashmir.  
 India and Pakistan both have, in their own opinions, legitimate claims to the region of 
Kashmir, especially as they pertain to security issues due to its location. The geo-strategic 
location of Kashmir has always been a priority for India, which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
emphasized. Nehru claimed, even before Kashmir’s official ascension to India that, “Kashmir, 
because of her geographical position with her frontiers…the Soviet Union, China, and 
Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India22.” 
From a security perspective, it is imperative that India continues its control over Kashmir. An 
independent Kashmir, however, was out of reach because of the perspective states’ security 
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analysis of the region’s location. The Pakistani perspective is also intimately connected with 
these ideas, but with an added dimension of identity politics. Pakistan, created as an area of 
refuge and a homeland for South Asian Muslims, views the Muslim-majority Kashmir as an 
obvious addition to its territory. On the other hand, Kashmir would give Pakistan better defense 
capabilities23. These geopolitical and state security goals keep Kashmir in the center of conflict, 
turning it into a true powder keg of South Asia and an area where human lives and identity 
politics takes a back seat to hard power and state security. 
 The idea of the borderland can inform the issue of decolonization, as subnational regions 
within postcolonial states often carry the added burden of being on either the edge of the former 
empire or on the edge of the new nation. “If state, regional elite, and local people are knit into a 
power structure in which the state clearly predominates, the creation of a borderland is also likely 
to be a relatively peaceful process,24” but given that the creation of India and Pakistan along with 
the partitioning of Kashmir between the two was anything but peaceful and the state did not have 
the power to align all of these players, Kashmir was born as a problematic borderland. In the 
case of the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, the region became an unruly borderland – 
power structures became less coherent and, although the Indian state dominates the regional 
politics, there was a failure to secure a commanding position over the local population. This 
sparked an insurgency which splintered into groups all vying to force the Indian state to give in 
to their demands, either an independent Kashmir, a Pakistani Kashmir, or even Islamist control. 
In response to this, the state attempts to enforce its sovereignty over the region, thus exposing 
itself as weak because “it oversteps the limits of its power and makes unrealistic claims to 
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overlordship over civil society.25” The policy then sparks militarization, which if it fails, the 
borderland will continue to be unruly and can even spark a reign of terror. All of these realities 
are present in today’s Kashmir, serving as a potential end-point for challenged decolonization 
that can be used to apply to different state interventions in other decolonized regions.   
Identity as a catalyst: the problem of an in-between state 
 Kashmir continues to be a major issue of contention in the postcolonial narrative and its 
connection to identity, state security, and fragility. One of the primary drivers of the conflict, 
identity, is due to an issue of “three compromised nationalisms.” An argument exists of 
arguments which are at odds with each other, as one commentator pointed out, “At its core, the 
Kashmir problem is are a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, 
secular nationalism epitomized by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris 
call Kashmiriyat26.” Although Pakistan views itself as the homeland for South Asian Muslims, 
Indian politics have started a different kind of argument: they are not the homeland for just the 
Hindus but all of the ethnic and religious groups of South Asia. The religious nationalism 
embodied by Pakistan, however, is flawed in its policies towards Kashmir, adding to the zero-
sum game of identity conflicts. The Pakistani religious nationalist narrative falls short because of 
the consequences of Kashmir joining Pakistan:  
“If Pakistan ‘liberates’ Kashmir from India, it runs the risk of seriously hurting 30 times 
as many Muslims as it ‘liberates’; if it does not try to ‘liberate’ rebelling Kashmiris, it 
compromises the very founding principle of its existence27.” 
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The logic for two separate nations for Hindus and Muslims was that they were not simply two 
different religions, but also two different ethnicities deserving of separate statehood. Pakistan 
embodies this dichotomy while India chose to increase a different kind of nationalistic rhetoric. 
For this reason, India views the argument that a Muslim-majority Kashmir must join the Muslim-
majority Pakistan to be invalid. Indian nationalism focuses on the question allegiance to India, 
that “Indianness” is not confined to a Hindu religious identity. To prove this end, India must 
keep control of Kashmir as a Muslim-majority region, proving to itself and to the international 
community that it is a secular, democratic, and peaceful nation capable of fostering difference. 
This is not to say that Kashmir was without its insurrections from the Hindu side, quite the 
contrary in fact. In 1952, Hindu nationalists led a riot in Jammu against the overall push for 
Kashmir to resist full integration with India28.  
 The idea of Kashmiriyat, of Kashmiriness, however, seems to provide a sort of answer to 
the question of identity’s role in conflict and how decolonization fits into the overall study of the 
“Third World” and the postcolonial. The complicated story of Kashmir’s location and the 
subsequent partition of India and Pakistan put the region between a rock and a hard place: a 
multiethnic population was forced to choose between a Muslim-majority nation and a secular-in-
name-only Hindu-majority nation. A semblance of an answer to this question was a movement 
towards Kashmiri nationalism, holding the identity of Kashmiriyat as the most important aspect 
of Kashmiri society. A Kashmiriyat identity, by its very existence, offers hope and security for 
the residents of Kashmir by circumventing the divide of religion exacerbated by the politics of 
partition and outlining a framework of which to think about oneself in greater national and 
geopolitical narratives, albeit in a secular way. There is, however, one major drawback of 
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thinking about oneself in an identity of a region rather than choosing a national allegiance – the 
Kashmiri insurgency aims for an independence while other insurgent groups fight for a Pakistani 
Kashmir. Both of these groups have greatly impacted India’s effectiveness in governing the 
region while employing terrorist tactics to reach their goals. Conflicting views of the future of 
the region have sparked terrorist attacks against India, both within Kashmir and across important 
Indian cities like Mumbai. President Bill Clinton described the region as the most dangerous 
place on earth, citing the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan in addition to the contention 
over Kashmir as the primary reasons for his commentary. Indeed, the insurgency alone has 
claimed over 47,000 lives according to Indian authorities, while Kashmir’s primary separatist 
group – All Parties Hurriyat – puts the number closer to 100,000 lost lives since the start of the 
insurgency in the late 1980s29. The violence ensuing from these insurgent groups greatly 
diminishes the effectiveness of the Indian state to maintain institutional and democratic strength, 
provoking the nation-state to hold itself in higher esteem than human livelihood. Insurgency 
greatly diminishes the effectiveness of the state to maintain strength in a certain simply because 
the goal of the terrorists themselves is to provoke an overreaction by the governing apparatus – 
turning citizens against the state and sowing the seeds for an overturn in power.  
Handling the fickleness of dispute  
 A major problem with analyzing conflict zones where control and sovereignty over them 
is disputed between multiple state actors is choosing how to frame the situation. Kashmir is 
disputed between, arguably, three parties: India, Pakistan, and a sovereign Kashmir movement. 
The current politics of control situation in Kashmir follows the Line of Control (LoC), 
established by the Simla Agreement that was signed in 1972, in the aftermath of the Bangladeshi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 "India Revises Kashmir Death Toll to 47,000," Reuters, last modified November 21, 2008, 
accessed April 26, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/21/idINIndia-36624520081121. 
	   23 
Liberation War (which, oddly, was the only war fought between Pakistan an India which did not 
directly include Kashmir). The Simla Agreement, signed in the Indian city of Simla by Indira 
Gandhi – the prime-minister of India – and Zulifkar Ali Bhutto – the president of Pakistan – 
accepts the Line of Control as a de facto border between the two nations (although subsequent 
incursions violated the agreement for years to come, it remains one of the primary signed 
agreements between the two nations):  
In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 
1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of 
either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual 
differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the 
threat or the use of force in violation of this Line30. 
 
In addition to the complicated situation between India and Pakistan, China also has a stake in the 
subject of the LoC and Kashmir through the Aksai Chin region. Although it is administered 
directly by the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, India ascertains that it is a part of the Ladakh 
region within Jammu and Kashmir. The Line of Actual Control keeps this view as a mere 
national myth, maintaining Chinese de facto control of Aksai Chin and creating another 
headache for defining the region of Jammu and Kashmir31.  
To help alleviate some of this tension in deciding which sovereign stake to view the 
conflict from, there will be a focus on the Kashmir region as administered by India, both as a 
reason for fragility in the over-all state of India and as a flashpoint for inter and intrastate 
conflict. Upon the accession of Kashmir to India on the condition that the Indian military aid in 
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repelling insurgency and tribal forces from Pakistan, the Indian representative to the United 
Nations submitted the following rationale for defense of the region: 
“The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed assistance 
because 1) they could not allow a neighboring and friendly state to be compelled by force 
to determine either its internal affairs or its external affairs; an 2) The accession of the 
Jammu and Kashmir state to the Dominion of India made India really responsible for the 
defense of the state32.”  
 
This chapter treats Kashmir as an entity within India and the implications of such an 
arrangement, as India administers the majority of the region with Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-
Baltistan remaining in de facto control of Pakistan. The question of fragility, however, centers on 
problems of the nation-state in the definition of Westphalia, placing a question mark on the 
legitimacy of looking at regions rather than the more traditional state level. This section will 
tackle this assumption, looking at nation-states not by their political decisions in the macro sense 
but as fragile due to a regional conflict, an intrastate concern that then transcends borders to draw 
in neighboring nations. Specifically, the problem of Kashmir as a larger state security and 
ongoing decolonization issue stems from Indian policies, Pakistani actions, and Kashmiri 
resistance movements. These parties, vying for power, have created a situation where the conflict 
is ill defined as intrastate but also problematic in the theories surrounding the interstate view. 
 Conflict after World War II has taken a turn towards intrastate over interstate: that is 
many violent outbreaks occur within countries instead of between them, having the opportunity 
however to spread across borders33. Numerically speaking, the trend shows that intrastate has 
been historically more common after World War II, with a peak in 1992 with forty-nine 	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recognized intrastate conflict zones. The latest numbers in this database from 2008 show thirty 
intrastate conflicts are compared to one interstate and six internationalized intrastate conflicts. 
This is an important consideration in the modern view of the postcolonial state and its role in the 
borderland: if conflict transcends borders, making them porous, how can the state defend itself 
and humans at the same time? The traditional view of the nation-state includes the idea of a 
border and a prohibition on cross-border interference of internal affairs. The theory of 
sovereignty, as a framework for this paradigm, defines physical border control as a major part of 
a state. The classical war model built upon experiences from the great wars is largely obsolete in 
relation of this new trend – thus requiring a look at the fragility in terms of the conflict rather 
than an issue of sovereignty and invasion. Claims over territory are important in this calculus as 
one of the causes of conflict, but the problem lies in the willingness of postcolonial states 
embroiled in conflict to put human lives first in their securing of problematic borderlands. The 
idea that “the provision of security, which includes the prevention of violence in social struggles, 
can be regarded as one of the central purposes of statehood,” demonstrates that states (like India, 
which retains de facto control over a large part of Kashmiri territory) have an imperative to 
defend its regions from violence. The failure, particularly in India’s case, to provide for the 
security of Kashmir creates fragility at the state level in addition to the more general regional 
struggle for control – bucking the notion that a nation-state’s borders are rigid and well-defined.  
 This chapter will view the debate over Jammu and Kashmir as follows: a region, disputed 
by three powers (India, Pakistan, and China), is mostly administered by India. This Indian region 
becomes then an issue of state security for the Indian government, both through internal 
insurgencies and through external threats of violence from Pakistan and China. In the process of 
maintaining control over state security, the remaining part of this chapter will dive into the 
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viability of securing a decolonized borderland as India struggles to maintain state security and 
actively taking steps which put into question the Indian government’s commitment to human life 
by way of being equally important as state security and survival of the government.  
 The United Nations played a major role in the peace proceedings between Pakistan and 
India, ideally setting up a status quo that was acceptable to both Pakistanis and Indians. Upon 
complaints from the Indian and Pakistani representatives to the UN, the Security Council passed 
two resolutions: one setting up the UNCIP (United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan) 
in January of 1948. The Indian army then launched an offensive, bringing us back to the first war 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Interestingly, the UNCIP passed a resolution in 
August of that year ordering ceasefire and withdrawal of tribal forces and troops by Pakistan and 
then by India to hold a plebiscite sponsored by local authorities34. 
 Now that the exceedingly brief overview and history of the Kashmir conflict has been 
explained, we can discuss why Kashmir is an important region to examine challenged 
decolonization and whether or not postcolonial states – defined as fragile states – can consider 
human wellbeing in their state security policies during times of conflict. Although pessimistic 
intuition and global experience of military clashes and civil strife draws us to a negative 
conclusion, Kashmir can be used as a historical yet very present case to use as a jumping off 
point to look at more contemporary examples of conflict zones within fragile states and the status 
of decolonization as a mission for national policies. Kashmir’s present stability as compared to 
other “hot zones” in the world gives us the freedom to explore deeper into the history of Indian 
policy choices as it tried to stabilize the region and itself against an insurgency, conflict with 
neighbors, and a growing trend towards globalization.  
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A tough question to answer: Do postcolonial lives matter? 
 It is important to start with the status of the Indian nation in the macroscopic-sense; that 
is to look at India as a fragile nation dealing with an intrastate conflict. India ranks eighty-first in 
the 2014 Fragile State Index, published by the Fund for Peace, making it somewhat in the middle 
of fragile states. It is by no means South Sudan but India is a far cry from top the least fragile 
states like Finland of Sweden, making it a nation where some concern should be paid to national 
issues like Kashmir – the analysis of the Fund for Peace shows that India is a fragile state on the 
mend. We can unpack this further, as the most stable states remain in regions of the world where 
colonization did not have a direct impact on their identities or politics. On the other hand, most 
of the world’s toughest regions are the postcolonial “third” and “second” worlds. “In the 1970s, 
analysts predicted dire consequences… internal violence in India, citing rapid population growth, 
economic mismanagement, and extensive poverty and corruption35,” but this trend has since 
changed. Now, the Fund for Peace explains, “India has turned itself around. It is the world's 
largest democracy, with a competitive economy and a representative political system36,” owing 
much of India’s success to Westernization and the globalized economy of the current century. It 
will be most helpful to consider the evolution of Indian policies towards Kashmir and the 
rhetoric employed to justify legislation and actions taken to integrate the region into the greater 
country post-partition.  
 India’s policies towards Kashmir are as varied as the conflict is complex: on one hand, 
billions of dollars have been poured in to help Kashmir develop and join the rest of the country 
as an emerging economic powerhouse. New Delhi has since provided a large development fund 
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for Kashmir in an attempt to appease the local population, creating a predicament where 
politicians from both Srinagar – the summer capital of Kashmir – and New Delhi “have no real 
interest in resolving the dispute,” because of heightened attention paid towards the region37. 
Taking this economic argument further, Kashmir may very well be a thorn in India’s side as it 
rises in international prestige and economic power. The conflict within Kashmir and open 
hostilities between India and Pakistan could spark another armed conflict and distract Indian 
leadership from economic development both in the Kashmir region and across India, particularly 
with the issue of nuclear proliferation and a testiness surrounding the use of nuclear weapons.  
 India’s overall policies pertaining to Kashmir can be separated into four historical 
periods: 1947-1953, 1954-1971, 1972-1988, and 1989-present. Because of the constantly 
evolving rhetoric and bubbling discontent within Kashmir and across the border between 
Pakistani and Indian forces, this paper will focus on the historical nature of each period rather 
than on currently evolving developments to test whether Indian legislation is written with 
Kashmir’s people in mind. The first phase, directly after the partition and the first Indo-Pakistani 
War, involved the heavy-handedness of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed that 
“Our history and our circumstances had made Kashmir so closely associated with our feelings, 
our emotions, thoughts, and passions that it was a part of our beings38.” This brought in the tough 
process of integrating Kashmir into India through war with Pakistan and direct military 
involvement.  
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 The second phase, once a majority of Kashmir was declared a part of India, was a 
backpedaling on the promise of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The period between 1954-1971 saw 
more direct conflicts between the Pakistan and India over Kashmir and India’s ministerial level 
talks over the outcome of the region, coupled with India’s passage of a critical law: The Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act. This act, passed in 1958 to manage the Naga rebellion by the 
Parliament of India, granted special powers to the armed forces to act in defined “disturbed 
areas,” was subsequently expanded in 1990 to include Kashmir39. Identity politics and 
decolonization initiatives were all but forgotten at the passage of this law which allows for armed 
forces, in an area that is declared disturbed, to: fire upon a person who is involved in acting 
against the law even if it causes death, arrest without warrant anyone who has committed 
cognizable offenses or is reasonably suspected of doing so, to enter and search any premise in 
order to make these arrests, and that army officers have legal immunity for carrying out these 
actions40. Such a law opened the floodgates to human rights abuses and the killings of civilians in 
Kashmir. The third phase was met with greater optimism, however, with the signing of the Simla 
Agreement and a demarcation of the Line of Control. During this period, a successful election in 
Kashmir put Sheikh Abdullah into power in 1977, a popular Muslim leader with a warm 
relationship with New Delhi. Abdullah signed an agreement that Kashmir was a unit of the 
Union of India and peace was brought to Kashmir for the first time since partition41. The 
optimism quickly ended, however, with the beginning of an insurgency against India coming 
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from Kashmir and the death of Sheikh Abdullah. The intifada from Kashmir caused terrorist 
attacks across the region and against government buildings in New Delhi and civilian centers in 
Mumbai. India’s primary promise of Kashmir’s autonomy was removed and direct military 
involvement, with troops numbering in the hundred thousands, descended into the region under 
the auspices that Kashmir was a “disturbed region.” This sparked direct conflict between the 
Kashmiri uprising, Kashmiri civilians, and Indian troops – along cross-border tensions with 
Pakistan.  
 India’s response to the insurgency and militant forces has been swift and brutal, causing 
daily deaths and hardships for Kashmiris in the valley. The numbers speak of a grim targeting: 
150-300 Hindu deaths at the hands of Islamic militants and the majority of deaths, Muslim. 
These deaths have carried out primarily by the Indian armed forces but also by armed militants 
silencing dissent within the community. A majority of Hindus living in the Kashmir Valley have 
since migrated to the Hindu-plurality region of Jammu and to refugee camps near Delhi. Prior to 
1990, more than 150,000 Hindus resided in the Kashmir Valley and since then, only a few 
thousand remain and the numbers are quickly dwindling down. Meanwhile, killings and 
massacres against Muslims have continued – a real tragedy unfolded in the “Imperiled Paradise.” 
Postcolonial theory pays great attention to the human experience, to the way humans are treated 
and how they feel in response to such incidents. The emotional truth of Kashmir is that the tragic 
circumstances have reduced the population to this: Kashmiri Muslims feel “mutilated and 
defiled” by the security forces while Kashmiri Hindu migrants feel “uprooted and betrayed” by 
their government with instances of defilement by the insurgency and religious-fanatic faction – 
Mujahideen42.  
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 India’s policies towards Kashmir have focused on securing the region in relation to 
Pakistan, insurgency forces, and the terrorist cells acting in the greater Indian territory – ignoring 
the need for a focus on humans and the assurance that an Indian Kashmir will foster a peaceful, 
flourishing existence. Kashmir has continued to be the same unruly borderland since the creation 
of India and Pakistan – a product of decolonization and compromised identity politics. 
Kashmiris, since the time of partition, have known tragedy and seen an internationalization of 
their woes. In the process, nuclear proliferation, terrorist attacks, and political stalemates have 
made the situation worse and any hope for an answer to the conflict even further away. India has 
not been able to meet the need of securing the region of Kashmir even though it views the region 
as an integral part of the nation. This speaks to the greater process of decolonization and the 
consequences of a process unrealized – how can a state stop and think about the human narrative 
when juggling international and intrastate threats against the government? Kashmir can be 
viewed as the present-day reality of challenged decolonization and compromised identities – we 
can use Kashmir to see the potential future of fledgling states that are only entering the 
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Chapter II 
Ukraine: (De)Colonizing the borderland 
And bring that peaceful paradise, 
Your own Ukraine, before your eyes; 
Then let your heart, in love sincere, 
Embrace her mighty ruin here! 
-Taras Shevchenko 
 
 Ukraine’s precarious position between Russia and the rest of Europe has, for centuries, 
made the land of sunflowers and wheat a battleground. Heroism has been ingrained into the very 
culture and language of Ukraine – there is a sense that the motherland is worth giving up your 
life to defend. Ukraine’s very name reflects this history: Traditional etymology traces the nation 
to the Slavic word for borderland. Ukraine has, for much of its history, been on the edge of 
empires, from Western Ukraine’s deep-rooted history with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
to Eastern Ukraine’s connection to the Russian Empire. These histories have manifested 
themselves in the modern Ukraine, including the language they speak, religious traditions, and 
even national identity. The issue is, however, what is this Ukraine, and can we truly call it a 
decolonized nation?  
The current unrest in Ukraine, from the Maidan revolution to the conflict in its eastern 
provinces, has revitalized a conversation about the status of the country as postcolonial. 
Scholarly research has turned to looking at Ukraine as a country formed from a fallen empire, 
rather than a country that has never experienced what we call colonialism and the postcolonial 
narrative of state-building, reliance on colonial powers, and issues in foundation of a national 
identity. This chapter will situate Ukraine as a postcolonial country in the process of handling 
decolonization from the greater Russian Empire and subsequent Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, 
in particular, has had a revolutionary role in shaping the modern issues Ukraine faces today. The 
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Soviet Union has never been a nation-state in the traditional sense, but a “multinational empire 
disguised as a federation43.” Each of the constituent republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics was framed as having its own revolutions, bringing each state together to form a 
federation. Post-1991 Ukraine had to deal with many of the classic problems associated with 
what we traditionally think of as postcolonial issues. Born from these problems of decolonization 
and exacerbated by the political realities of the newly formed state, explosive identity politics 
formed. We see these very issues: West versus East, Russian-speaking versus Ukrainian-
speaking, and Catholic versus Orthodox in all levels of socio-political life in the country. To 
understand the present situation in Ukraine, and to begin thinking about the future in order to 
make reliable predictions, Ukraine is situated in a postcolonial world. The chapter will conclude 
by looking at Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in particular, tracing the specific issues present in this 
part of the county as a direct consequence of colonization and identity politics.  
Ukraine’s shaky foundations 
 Ukraine’s history of being on the edges of empire begins early in its history, even before 
this land became known as Ukraine. For the purposes of this project, and the understanding of 
the current problems Ukraine faces, we will primarily focus on contemporary Ukraine as a post-
Soviet nation-state, while paying homage to early history of imperial expansion of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. This section 
will look at the claim that Ukraine is a postcolonial nation, coming to the conclusion that the 
problem of Ukraine is that its foundations are very much in line with normative theories and 
practice of post-colonialism and decolonization – while complicating these very ideas by 
creating a space where meaningful comparisons between postcolonial experiences can be made 	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while respecting contextual differences. Modern Ukraine can easily be defined as an outcome of 
the imperial aspirations of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union – with the Soviet 
Union taking on a heavy stance of Russification and de-Ukrainianization along the years 
(shaping the conversation of national identity for decades to come). This framing of the 
foundation of Ukraine as postcolonial can help inform the current situation in the eastern 
portions of the country, along with hints of the potential future. In addition to situating Ukraine 
as a product of its history, we can also begin to draw connections to other, more traditionally 
labeled postcolonial countries such as India and Pakistan, along with much of the current “third 
world.” Combining the “second world” with the “third world” can allow us to start looking at 
current unrest in the world as a product of a more global history of colonial expansion and 
subsequent decolonization.   
Postcolonial theories have long skirted around the issue of the Soviet bloc – or the 
“second world.” Even Edward Said had largely ignored the complicated nature of the Russian 
and Soviet empires, referencing the issue in name only as being just as imperialist as the French 
and British empires.44 The reason for this apparent ignoring of Russia’s imperialism could stem 
from, “the grave abuses committed by Russia as an imperial power have been obscured by its 
geographical contiguity with its colonies and by the sheer awfulness of its own twentieth-century 
history, which has enabled the Russians to claim victimhood with some plausibility and moral 
impact45.” This argument in Russia has, however, fallen short of looking at Ukraine and many of 
the other former republics of the Soviet Union and guberniyas of the Russian Empire. Instead, 
Russian narratives have focused on the Foucaultian idea of internal colonization – that Russia 
experienced a prolonged self-colonization at the hands of Peter the Great in the Russian Empire, 	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resulting in botched decolonization in the twentieth century by the revolution and subsequent 
formation of the Soviet Union46. This is an interesting point for looking at the way Russia views 
itself and its territories – self-colonization could incorporate the idea that Ukraine has always 
been part of a greater unified East Slavic nation, led by the Third Rome (Moscow). In addition, 
an interesting moment arises in the rhetoric surrounding Russia’s relationship with the historical 
Kievan Rus’, the birthplace of Orthodox Russian civilization. Indeed many parts of modern 
Ukraine are steeped in historical significance for the Eastern Slavs, leading to an idiosyncratic 
view of Ukraine in the eyes of Russia: Ukrainians are the little brothers of the Russians. This 
aspect of the way Ukrainian identity is, in large part, shaped by Russian views will be dissected 
further. Topically, these postcolonial narratives have skirted regions like Central Asia, the 
Caucuses, and Eastern Europe, although these regions have experienced direct and complex 
Russian involvement in local realities for centuries (whether through conquest or economic 
dependencies).  
This project, however, focuses on the experiences of Ukraine as a postcolonial nation, 
dealing with the consequences of decolonization in a manner not unlike Kashmir’s experience in 
the partition of India and Pakistan. “Of all the subjects of the former Russian empire, Ukraine 
has had one of the most complicated and difficult relationships with the metropoly,47” shaping 
the current situation in Ukraine (particularly Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) and its possible future 
outcomes. Following the narrative of colonialism, Ukraine’s marginalized position has also been 
reflected in the international stage: Ukraine’s history is often conflated with that of its neighbor, 
Russia across the globe, and as Mark von Hagen noted in his 1995 essay “Does Ukraine Have a 
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History?” Ukraine has been treated as an object rather than a study of history48. Now that it is 
possible to look at Ukraine in the lens of decolonization, the complicated relationship between 
Russia and its former colonies can be examined further, offering us potential lessons for the 
larger study of colonialism and decolonization.  
The first logical place to start an examination of Ukraine as a postcolonial nation would 
be in its relationship with the colonial power (namely, Russia). The lengthy process of 
suppressing Ukrainian culture in the Russian Empire (and subsequently in the Soviet Union) has 
been brutal and tragic – an issue that George Grabowicz describes as “…generic and constitutes 
a paradigmatic post-colonial issue.” Since the mid-seventeenth century onwards, Ukrainian 
culture has been institutionally oppressed in a way that was not dissimilar to the experiences of 
the Irish at the hands of the British. There is, however, an interesting aspect of the narrative that 
Ukraine is a decolonized country in that the colonial history lacks the dimension of race so often 
found in postcolonial studies – these are “White colonies.” To argue this point, it is helpful to 
view the problem in a similar vein to Russia’s own self-colonization, reducing the impact of race 
in the normative post-colonial narrative in Russia’s colonies, 
There is a basic qualitative difference: decrees were passed limiting and prohibiting such 
languages and literatures as Ukrainian and Lithuanian, not Russian. Beyond that, 
membership in the dominant nation transcended class distinction: a Russian laborer could 
feel superior to a Ukrainian intellectual because the latter was a “khokhol,” by itself this 
is racial discrimination without actually invoking color of skin (although that, of course, 
was also a factor in both the Russian and the Soviet empire: one need only to recall the 
contempt for the “churki”). And when this becomes a pattern of behavior in the so-called 
ethnic territories, it is hardly distinguishable from the behavior and values of classical 
colonialism.49 
 
Ukraine – as a region within the greater Russian sphere of influence – has been altered in a 
deeply fundamental, cultural level. The idea of “Ukrainianness” and of a distinct Ukrainian 	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culture has been attacked over the centuries. In fact, Russian views of Ukraine have long been 
shaped by the differences between the two cultures, particularly in the spoken language. One 
famous example of Russian dismissal of Ukrainian culture has been popular Russian literary 
critic Vissarion Belinsky’s notorious dismissal of Taras Shevchenko’s poetry, for it was written 
in the Ukrainian language. Shevchenko, considered a national hero in Ukraine, was ridiculed for 
using the “wrong” language. On the other hand, Russian narratives of the prototypical Ukrainian 
have focused on Russian fondness of Ukrainian food, songs, and dance – creating an image of 
the pastoral Ukrainian, much in the vein of colonial stereotypes manufactured in imperial centers 
over their colonies.50 The same issue is seen in the social mobility of Ukrainians within the 
empire – it was possible, much like in Ireland, for a Ukrainian to move up the social ladder, with 
a catch however. Ukrainians were allowed to reach high levels of government in both the 
Ukrainian SSR and the greater USSR bureaucracy if they had given up their national identity – a 
denationalization of identity. This meant that elites were required to be Ukrainian without being 
Ukrainian, prompting a migration of elites to metropolitan centers within Ukraine and to the 
larger cities in Russia proper.  
 How did these feelings of linguistic and national superiority play out in the political 
landscape of Ukraine? The story is much more complicated than a case of colonization. Policies 
stemming from the formation of the Soviet Union were unstable towards the problem of 
Ukrainian identity and culture, along with its place in a new Socialist federation. In the 
revolution of 1917-1920, the case for Ukrainian identity grew dire: the post-revolutionary 
climate in the region leaned heavily on Russification, along with the rising theory of the 
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“struggle of two cultures.” Supported by Communist party leaders in Ukraine, the theory 
maintained that Russian culture is the more sophisticated, urban culture and would slowly absorb 
the lesser Ukrainian culture in a “Darwinian contest of cultural strength.” The mainstream party 
elite in Russia and Ukraine soon condemned the theory, but these sentiments have been deeply 
ingrained in Ukrainian understandings of their place vis-à-vis Russians – even under the, 
apparent, united front of Communism. Ideas of Russian supremacy have been ingrained in 
Ukrainian society since the Russian Empire – the Ems Ukaz, for example, banned the use of 
Ukrainian language in print. The Russian Empire also persecuted hundreds of bandurists, 
wandering musicians in the Ukrainian countryside who sang in the native language.51 Cultural 
suppression is a defining feature of an imperial and colonial power, but if the next decades 
consisted of a sustained subjugation of the submissive culture by the dominant culture, then the 
story may be much simpler. The tides changed, however, with Stalin’s appointment of Lazar 
Kaganovich to oversee a program of ukrainizatsiya (Ukrainianzation) to attract ethnic Ukrainians 
into the fold of the Communist party. There was, however, an ulterior motive to revitalizing the 
local culture that can bolster the colonialist argument: Stalin had handpicked and installed his 
own “man” to the job, meaning that Moscow had a firm control of just how this cultural 
revitalization would be carried out. Ukrainianization during this period was, however, at odds 
with the growing Communist idea that national boundaries and identities must be wiped out in 
favor of Soviet dominance52. These ideas were inherited from the Tsarist regime, as the “Soviet 
definitions of ‘colony’ and ‘colonialism’ reflect the traditional absence in Russia of a precise 
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distinction between the problem of nationalities and the colonial question.53” To this end, the 
Holodomor seemed to have solved the issue of both Ukrainian nationalism and the colonization 
or integration of Ukraine into a greater Soviet Union. The Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a 
widespread famine affecting Ukraine, causing the deaths of millions of people. The Soviet and 
subsequent Russian government have not recognized this event as a genocide, although there is a 
large corpus of evidence that this could have been an engineered act on the part of Stalin. 
Regardless of this academic debate, forced economic modernization and farming collectivization 
on the part of Stalinist policies created a massive famine, which undermined a large part of 
Ukrainian nationalist movements for years to come.54 The “new Soviet man” was supposed to 
remove the issue of ethnic nationalism, but this only increased the role Russian culture and 
Russian identity played in the Soviet Union55. Of course there would not be a focus on identity 
and ethnic difference if everyone in the Soviet Union identified as Russian. With the political 
and economic base of the country located in Moscow, the Russian language and Russian culture 
became a driving force across the Soviet Union, reversing any gains made in Ukrainian cultural 
revival.  
Despite Moscow’s seemingly slower pace of Russification, the specter of the khokhol 
was deeply ingrained into the Russian psyche. Ukrainians were still portrayed as pastoral people, 
sometimes bordering on barbaric and brutal in their irrational nationalism. This is mostly how 
the Soviet narrative continued until the independence of Ukraine and the beginning of the 
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modern Ukrainian state: waves of Ukrainian national empowerment (controlled by the central 
Communist apparatus in Moscow) and waves of heavy Russification of culture and a removal of 
Ukrainian identity. Such waves helped to create a stark contrast in regions that were heavily 
urbanized (especially in the East and South of Ukraine) and those with more rural bases (mainly 
in the West). This makes for a weak foundation to a budding nation-state, one that is plagued in 
border issues, hostile neighbors, and domestic identity issues. The difficulty with Ukraine, and 
why the country continues to be a “problem region” in the world, is because of this faulty 
foundation.  
 Cultural colonialism was a major factor in solving the Ukrainian problem, but more direct 
Russian colonization in the form of the movement of people and redrawing of borders is also 
evident in the formation of modern Ukraine. One such issue was in the transference of the 
Crimean peninsula from Russia to Ukraine under the Khrushchev government in 1954. The 
Supreme Soviet (Verkhovniy Soviet) of the Soviet Union, Soviet of the Russian SFSR, and the 
Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR each approved the transfer. The transfer of the land at the time had 
(topically) little meaning above the symbolism, putting into question exactly why the land was 
transferred in the first place. Nikita Khrushchev, an ethnic Russian, had reportedly been 
extremely fond of Ukraine and gifted the land as a sign of goodwill. This could be true, but the 
realities of the decision would be catastrophic in the future. The Russian population within 
Ukraine increased by a million people, and the rhetoric surrounding this transfer was based in the 
uniting of the Ukrainian people with the Russian state – a symbolic gesture commemorating 300 
years since the Treaty of Pereyaslav56. Declassified papers from the time of the transference 
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spoke of the “boundless trust and love the Russian people feel toward the Ukrainian people.” In 
addition, these communications spoke of a geopolitical and economic reasoning: “the territorial 
proximity of Crimea to Ukraine, the commonalities of their economies, and the close agricultural 
and cultural ties between the Crimean oblast and the UkrSSR.” This, however, was misleading: 
the cultural ties between Russia and Crimea were much stronger than with Ukraine, for the 
majority of the population in the peninsula was indeed Russian at 75 percent, while only 25 
percent were ethnic Ukrainians. Enlarging the population of “native Russians” in Ukraine meant 
that there would be greater control over the Ukrainians by the Soviet Union, and by extension, 
the Russian government in Moscow. This act by the Russian SFSR and earlier acquisition of land 
from Poland and Romania during World War II resulted in the drawn borders and faulty 
foundations of today’s Ukraine – a hallmark of colonial rule, where the colonial power is able to 
draw the map in essentially any way it wishes. Modern Ukraine is a result of these acquisitions in 
territory, exacerbating demographic and historical differences between different regions of the 
country.57  
The country is in a complicated position, as it is going through three distinct transitory 
phases at once: “the movement from a dictatorship to a democracy, from a command economy to 
a free market, and from an empire to statehood.58” In short, Ukraine is nation under construction 
– it is evolving from a constituent of empire with an uneven national identity to one with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
created a legal basis of external domination, resulting in assimilation of Ukrainian elite into the 
greater Russian culture by the eighteenth century. The commemoration of this event by 
transferring the Russian-dominated Crimea to Ukraine has its own dramatic irony; one needs 
only to invoke the idea of the Trojan Horse.  
57 Mark Kramer, "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?," Wilson Center, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago. 58	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unified civic and political national culture – a shaky undertaking, at best59. How do we further 
define Ukraine as postcolonial, fitting the model of the colonial world? Riabchuk takes the 
stance that Ukraine is a postcolonial creole state, meaning that the state is dominated by 
descendants of Russian settlers and by Russified Ukrainians. He is able to maintain this view by 
looking at the modernization and urbanization in Ukraine, followed directly by large-scale 
Russification. Ukrainian cities, specifically those in the South and East, unsurprisingly the most 
industrial and urbanized, are heavily Russian speaking. Donetsk, Kharkov, Dnipropetrovs’k, 
Odessa, and Mariupol are among the largest urban centers with a Russian-speaking majority. 
Indeed even in Kiev, Russian remains the lingua franca.60 This has fueled the West-East divide 
we so often see in the media today as a large factor in the Ukrainian crisis, prompting a 
conversation of identity politics as being intimately related to the postcolonial experience and 
decolonization.  
Is it a question of who we are?  
 Compromised identity politics may be a hallmark of a postcolonial nation attempting to 
address a legacy of colonial rule, where differences in identities were disregarded and oftentimes 
actively put at odds with one another by the ruling power. National identity, in its most basic 
sense, is a “feeling of solidarity and unity among the people living in a state.61” Ukraine has a 
long and complicated history of national identity, based on its shaky foundations and exacerbated 
by recent decades of stark differences in Ukrainian nationalist movements and political realities 
in the country and in its relation to other nations. A prominent Ukrainian dissident writer, Ivan 
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Dzyuba, lamented on the eve of perestroika policies, “Ukrainian culture is a culture with an 
incomplete structure.62” With this in mind, it is important to consider the effects of compromised 
identities on decolonization as a process. If a connection can be drawn where compromised 
identities further complicate decolonization, leading to added tension, then a worthwhile 
conversation about the roots of the current conflict in Ukraine can be sparked. Understanding the 
root causes of Ukraine – and what we can learn from other regions’ experiences – can lead us 
down a road where we understand what each group involved wants and how to find a settlement 
for a complicated and dangerous problem. Global issues can be historicized in a way where there 
is a dialogue between current political stalemates and group motivations in these impasses as a 
result of specific historical narratives. 
Leading up to the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians largely approved of 
independence. The issue now was to centralize power and political legitimacy in Kiev, rather 
than in Moscow. For decades, Eastern Ukraine in particular looked to the driving force in 
Moscow for help and guidance rather than to the subnational governmental center in Kiev. This 
process was easier said than done, as Ukraine inherited a space that was also multi-ethnic and 
steeped in historical colonialism. One can break up Ukraine into two primary regions, which has 
become closely associated with the current unrest and how the international community frames 
Ukrainian geography. Western Ukraine has its historical base in a Polish, Hungarian, and 
Romanian past while Eastern Ukraine has known Russian domination for centuries. Western 
Ukraine became the center of the Ukrainian language and identity, while Eastern Ukraine 
became largely Russified. This resulted in three de facto national identities based on these 
historical differences among ethnicities and languages: Ukrainophone Ukrainians, Russophone 	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Ukrainians, and Russophone Russians – these are oftentimes at odds with each other, especially 
in terms of aspirations of policies around orienting towards Europe or towards Russia63. The 
latter two are undoubtedly concentrated in the East while the Ukrainian speakers dominate 
Western Ukraine. There exists two Ukraine’s in this framework: the Western regions of the 
country never fully internalized Soviet rule. Western Ukrainians continued to baptize their 
children as Greek Catholics and continued to celebrate their much more Central European 
identity64. Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, has a much different situation: “Donetsk 
represents what the Soviets built…the brave new world of victorious revolution and proletarian 
internationalism.”65 Eastern Ukraine is indistinguishable from dozens of regions across the 
former Soviet Union. We can further complicate the issue for ourselves by looking at nationalist 
tendencies in Ukraine and how strata of Ukrainian society fall into these categories, in addition 
to their spoken language: 
Ethnic Ukrainians and Russian nationalists, who incorporate Ukrainian ethnic nationalists 
in the late Soviet era; civic nationalists who encompass the entire democratic ideological 
spectrum, support Ukrainian independence and an inclusive, civic state; and finally, 
Soviet nationalists who reject the very idea of an independence Ukrainian state.66 
 
Together, these identities overlap and complicate the issue of an independent Ukraine – 
informing the very political systems that are today tearing the country apart and complicating 
relationships with other countries and supranational entities, specifically in Ukrainian 
interactions with Russia, the CIS, the EU, and NATO.   	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These cultural identities and nationalist definitions of self along with a relationship to the 
“state” emerge in the political and economic stage in their opinions of an appropriate closeness 
to Russia. Conventional wisdom tells us that the inhabitants Eastern and Southern Ukraine, 
where the majority of Russophones can be found, favor Ukrainian independence only in terms of 
economic benefits, as they can more easily sway the economic future of Ukraine in comparison 
to the more much larger Russia. The promise of higher standards of living may not be enough to 
hold the country together, as seen in the Ukrainian crisis beginning in 2014. In the early history 
of Ukrainian independence, shortly after 1991, the emergence of market Capitalism and ability 
for the industrialized East to sell its resources was enough to (tentatively) recognize the 
legitimacy of Kiev. The continued support of the Russian language – and by extension, pro-
Russian, anti-nationalist testaments – by the government in Kiev was instrumental to maintaining 
Ukrainian territorial integrity.67 History and the current situation in Ukraine have taught us that 
the leaning of the Ukrainian government in its early years, including ambiguity towards the West 
and support for Russia, was not a constant. Pro-European sentiments especially stemming from 
Western portions of the country drove a wave of Ukrainian nationalism, from the unrest in the 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev to the creation of a new government (that quickly banned the 
Communist Party from the Verkhovna Rada). We must now question: What does being 
Ukrainian mean?   
 This is a much more complicated question to answer – as it reaches beyond Ukrainian 
speakers in the West and Russian speakers in the East. Centuries of colonial rule have blurred 
these issues of identity in order to favor direct Russian dominance. The modern issue of 
Ukrainian identity is informed by this history of dominance and “othering” that was created: 
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Ukrainian nationalists were painted as extremely dangerous and likened to Nazis; regardless of 
the veracity of these remarks, words like a “Banderaite” became ethnic slurs. The othering of the 
Ukrainian identity culminated in the view that identifying strongly with being Ukrainian became 
less modern – it became provincial, archaic, and backward. Russian culture and, to a greater 
extent, Russian identity was crafted as modernized, urban, and necessary for cohesion in a multi-
ethnic empire, such as the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The “indigenous population” of 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, were made into an oppressed majority over 
centuries of oppressive practices. The question remains in contemporary Ukraine, and in regions 
where this view of the “provincial Ukrainian” persists, of the ability for these backward, 
“country bumpkins” that are the Ukrainian-speakers to successfully manage a country and make 
the “proper” decisions. These Ukrainians must create a political system without oppressing the 
Russian-speakers in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine while also following the orders of the 
country’s big brother, Russia. Whether or not the Ukraine as a whole is willing to move towards 
or away from Russia is a non-issue, as there is an expectation on the part of the decolonization 
narrative that the postcolonial still pay homage to the colonial power.68  
Applying theory: Without nuclear weapons, with many problems 
 Decolonization as a process is complicated in itself, but the additional feat of finding 
some sort of textbook step-by-step guide to transitioning from dependence to sovereignty is at a 
different level. With “second world” countries like those in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and 
the Balkans, experiencing similar effects of decolonization as those traditional “third world” 
countries, it would seem to be an easy connection. Ukraine as an example of a potentially 
postcolonial, decolonized nation-state is a contestable idea, indeed. The Soviet Union certainly 
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did not view their possessions as colonies under any circumstances, with mainstream Soviet 
rhetoric condemning Western colonialism. It is with an irony only fitting for Eastern Europe that 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev explained in a speech that, 
“the Soviet people adhere to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Communism is the most 
humanist of ideologies. It is strongly opposed to all and every kind of oppression, to all 
and every kind of exploitation. The Soviet people consider the colonial system, under 
which the bulk of the world’s population were doomed to poverty and disfranchisement, 
to be a shameful, unjust page in the history of man. That is why, in keeping with Lenin’s 
precepts, we have always come out strongly in [favor] of liberating all peoples from 
colonial bondage.69” 
 
In practice, this propaganda of the Communist anti-colonialism coming from Khrushchev 
himself fell apart at the seams if considering the colonialist attitudes found in the Russian/Soviet 
subjugation of its constituent republics.  
 The true nature of decolonization and the ability for a country to be defined as 
postcolonial can be found in the process of moving from dependency to sovereignty. Ukraine 
experienced increased momentum of national liberation coupled with demands for sovereignty 
that continued throughout the Soviet period. This also excludes independence movements that 
flourished in the early history of the Soviet Union and during the Russian Civil War, where 
independent Ukrainian governments were founded and subsequently crushed by the Bolsheviks. 
Decolonization defined through a lens of a prolonged process rooted in the historical past of a 
region can be particularly helpful in viewing Ukraine and explaining ongoing issues, which were 
present in 1991 and the foundation of an independent Ukraine.  
As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disintegrated and moved towards independent 
states, many of these countries still felt as if Moscow held the reigns to their futures. With this in 
mind, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed to help retain power 	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structures (albeit symbolic) similar to those found in the Soviet Union. Namely, Russia took to 
the helm of the newly formed CIS. Ukraine’s history with the CIS was particularly difficult, as 
many of the early Ukrainian leadership did not trust that the CIS would be a beast of a different 
nature than the Soviet Union. At the same time, Ukraine was left with an outdated Soviet 
military, economic, and physical infrastructure coupled with the fact that Ukraine let go of its 
inherited nuclear weapons arsenal – any confrontations with Russia was, unequivocally, out of 
the question. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union created deeply rooted colonial problems, leaving a 
newly independent Ukraine with Soviet infrastructure but no path towards decolonizing itself 
from its past. Decolonization is a tricky word to define and even more challenging to carry out, 
leaving most parties involved in moving a country from dependency to sovereignty unsatisfied. 
Decolonization in itself is a “clutch of fitful activities and events, played out in conference 
rooms, acted out in protests mounted in city streets, fought over in jungles and mountains.70” 
Ukraine could be viewed as built in a day, so to speak, as it declared independence and the 
government immediately found itself charged with building a nation, doing away with a Soviet 
past, and contemplating the issues of potential de-Russification policies.  
Can we conceptualize Ukraine as a decolonized country? This would largely depend on 
how decolonization is defined. In the traditional sense, decolonization involves doing away with 
colonialist rule – this happened in Ukraine if Russian and Soviet rule over Ukraine is defined as 
colonialism. There is another, more interesting interpretation of decolonization that is more 
revolutionary and drastic than a simple process; if we understand decolonization to mean “that 
which sets out to change the order of the world, is a program of complete disorder,” or a “violent 
phenomenon,” and a “total, complete, and absolute substitution,” then defining Ukraine as 
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decolonized is difficult. In reality, Ukraine underwent a very strange series of events leading up 
to its independence that puts into question just what we consider decolonization71. The events in 
Ukraine in 1991 could be defined as a compromise between pro-Russian, pro-Soviet 
Communists and opposing anti-Soviet national democrats. The Communists accepted an 
independent Ukraine in return for a continuation of the “ancien regime” of the Soviet Union 
(although, officially decommunized and decolonized). Ukraine did not experience the bloody 
revolutions, nor did it experience a smooth pullout of Russia. Ukraine continues to straddle two 
worlds: the first is where Ukraine is in the midst of decolonization, of doing away with a colonial 
Russian past while the other Ukraine looks to keep the status quo of its colonial past, all under 
the guise of de-jure independence72.  
 A new perspective on decolonization can be drawn from Ukraine’s experiences that can 
be of use for greater comparisons between different experiences of colonial rule. Ukraine is 
currently in a transitory period, but for much of its modern history (the 1990s) the colonial status 
quo has controlled the country, and continues to inform the current unrest, political instability, 
and regional violence. Decolonization is somewhere between a violent break from the ancien 
regime and a nuanced dialogue between the old order and a slowly developing new reality. If this 
definition of decolonization is true, then Ukraine has experienced a slowly developing new 
reality that is deeply ingrained in the previously established and continuously validated status 
quo of the Soviet Union but is currently experiencing a violent response to this assertion 
(violence against this system and violence for the continued propagation of the colonial old 
regime rule).   
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 Despite the lack of early violence in its decolonization process, Ukraine experienced 
decolonization in a remarkably similar way to other nations that are traditionally associated with 
colonial rule. Ukraine’s borders were, for the most part, artificially drawn and the country’s 
relationship to the former ruling power has been one of subordination since independence. The 
political processes of Ukraine have also been heavily informed by the country’s colonial past 
along with the direct conversation and (most recently) conflict with the parent of such a history. 
The 1990s collapse of the Ukrainian economy sparked nostalgia in the Southern and Eastern 
portions of the country for the command economy of the past, and pro-Russian sentiments rose 
in response to such nostalgia. These regions of the country have a much more intimately 
connected economic history with Russia – it is the South and East that also supported a move for 
independence because of the perceived economic benefits. Now that the economy was in worse 
shape, nostalgia for the colonial past spiked. The economic side of the colonialism story is an 
integral part to the current political situation in Ukraine – Moscow commanded the economy and 
now that the future of Ukrainian prosperity rested in the hands of Kiev, it was integral that the 
industrialized East and South received direct benefits. Western Ukrainians, on the other hand, 
voted and supported based on identity politics and the promotion of the Ukrainian heritage – 
prompting the Kiev government to find a way to bridge the two focuses. Proving impossible, a 
succession of Ukrainian nationalist and pro-Russian leadership took the post with promises 
aimed at the different regions of the country. These problems were in fact a result of a larger 
legacy from the Soviet Union – a multi-ethnic empire with a command economy could not marry 
these issues together, bringing about the fall of the empire and the creation of new, postcolonial 
states that subsequently inherited these very issues.  
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 The elite discourses of these issues in Ukraine are integral to understanding how 
decolonization functions on the national level – it is one thing for these differences to play out on 
a regional or even local scale, but the future of the country is in the hands of what happens in the 
halls of the Verkhovna Rada and on the streets of Kiev, or in the Maidan. This is where changes 
in Ukraine’s road to the future can be drastically altered, as seen in the popular uprising and 
overhaul of 2014 and the Orange Revolution years earlier. The Ukrainian political system is one 
of a multi-party democracy with a prime minister and a president at the helm. Most of these 
parties have a drastically different outlook on Ukraine, mirroring the postcolonial problems 
inherited after the fall of the Soviet Union – the very issues of identity and decolonization have a 
national and even international significance. These parties can be categorized as largely 
supporting the future of Ukraine in the following ways: Ukraine as Europe, Ukraine as 
Alternative Europe, and Ukraine as Greater Europe. Each viewpoint has manifested itself in the 
official discourse, proving for a rocky relationship between Ukraine and its former colonizing 
power, Russia.73  
Ukraine as Europe is currently garnering a large amount of attention, as this viewpoint 
frames Ukraine as being “fundamentally different from a non-European Russia.” This movement 
was instrumental in rebuilding a Ukrainian identity that did not trace its roots to a common 
history with Russia – in fact, it was the opposite: it was this view that helped to create a 
postcolonial narrative for Ukraine, that the Ukrainian people experienced oppression from the 
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and even contemporary examples of Russia’s energy policies. 
This coupled with the idea that “Ukraine was imagined as an inherently European nation – as 
part of a European civilization that had deviated from its natural path due mostly to external 	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pressures (i.e. Russian and then Soviet oppression)” was integral in the Eurointegration 
movement and pivoting Kiev away from Moscow and towards Brussels.74 This view has also 
informed a great deal of Ukrainian foreign policy, especially in the relationship of Ukraine to the 
traditional Russian sphere of influence: Ukraine supported Azerbaijan in their war against 
Armenia (a close ally of Russia), Georgian conflict with Abkhazian separatists, and even 
(rumored) involvement in Chechen separatist movements in Russia.  
The Alternative Europe model harkens back to the by-gone days of the Soviet Union and 
a cultural closeness to Russia and Belarus as East Slavic nations. Alternative Europe was a way 
for Ukraine to move back into a colonial relationship, under an authoritarian leadership (which 
was viewed as the only way to preserve unity). To remove the colonialist framework from this 
view, as many Russian and pro-Russian sources counter, “The Russian Empire was imagined not 
as an ethnically Russian center that had colonized neighboring lands, but as an entity here the 
ancestors of modern Ukrainians had plays as important a role as the ancestors of modern 
Russians.” Ukraine’s self-identification with Belarus and Russia helped shape this Alternative 
Europe model as a brotherly confederation of peoples, best united under a common East Slavic 
flag.75  
 Finally, Ukraine as part of a Greater Europe seems to be growing in popularity as an 
option for Ukrainian neutrality between an expanding European Union and a long-established 
Russian sphere of influence. This model posits that Ukraine has longstanding connections with 
both Europe and Russia but is unique in its own right – it does not fit entirely with the group of 
European nations and the group of pro-Russian nations. This particular viewpoint is nuanced in 
that it opens a conversation for Ukraine’s future which can be at the same time pro-European and 	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pro-Russian, or neither, as there s a focus on the pragmatic rather than normative discourse. It 
does not necessarily matter if Ukraine is more European or more Slavic, what matters are the 
possibilities for benefitting from these relationships (economic benefits, for example).76 The 
problem, however, is that this model does not inform a Ukrainian history nor does it attempt to 
reconcile a colonial past with a postcolonial present, nor does it touch on the process of 
decolonization.  
 These models help us create an image of the current Ukraine as in a state of 
decolonization, where the country as a whole is constantly renegotiating its history, its 
relationship to the colonizer, its relationship to potential partners like the European Union, and 
contending with issues of compromised identities that have boiled over to incite direct conflict. 
The official discourse has fluctuated between all three of these models, moving from 
administration to administration, and particularly after the Orange Revolution and the current 
aftershocks of the Maidan. The feeding of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities between the 
regions into how greater Ukraine functions on the international scale is hugely important in 
understanding its future – Ukraine has many options to choose from in this path towards 
becoming a modern nation-state. Each model informs how the country is likely to move next, 
from the fervent pro-Europeanism of the Tymoshenko group during the Orange Revolution to 
the quiet pro-Russian sentiment under Yanukovych. Now, Ukraine’s path is again unclear: a pro-
European Kiev with a staunchly pro-Russian Donbas and effectively anti-Ukrainian Crimea. The 
postcolonial framework maintains that the path to nation-statehood and foundation of a 
functional state are made particularly difficult by decolonization. This is seen directly in the way 
that Southern and Eastern Ukraine have been so heavily Russified, that any changes to the 
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dominance Russian culture in the country are perceived as a direct attack on the Russian identity. 
The Maidan movement and subsequent overthrow of the pro-Russian government is also born 
from this same issue: Ukraine’s identity crisis is a direct product of colonization and complicated 
decolonization. We can begin to compare how different states respond to decolonization, 
especially at a subnational and interstate level: taking Kashmir’s present situation and viewing 
Ukraine’s predicament in a similar light can unlock the potential outcomes and the future of the 
war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The next chapter will finally bring these 
two histories together: Kashmir’s compromised identities and Ukraine’s identity crisis under the 
umbrella of decolonization and provide a framework to be able to make conclusions about the 
future. Ukraine’s national anthem sings of a Ukraine that has not yet perished and dreams of a 
day when Ukrainians will be able to rule a free land of their own: a wish complicated by 
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Chapter III 
Looking forward: lessons for the future 
From birth it is clear to him that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called 
in question by absolute violence. 
-Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
 
 Kashmir’s present conflict and the future woes of Eastern Ukraine are not found in a 
vacuum – they are, in fact, part of a greater narrative of disastrous attempts at decolonization, 
state building, and the formation of compromised identities (although, the presence of these 
issues across the globe give us a point of departure for meaningful comparisons for a better 
future). The issue now is to look at the potential connection between Kashmir’s present and the 
future of Eastern Ukraine: Will the region follow in the footsteps of Kashmir to become a 
disputed territory and gain the reputation of being the world’s most dangerous region? The main 
concern from the all sides in the Ukrainian conflict is whether or not Ukraine will become the 
next Kashmir – a frozen conflict without a sense of reconciliation coupled with identity politics 
that are disastrously compromised. To answer this question, it is imperative to contextualize 
Kashmir and Eastern Ukraine as a product of their own, unique positions. It is foolhardy to draw 
lines between two regions with different histories and narratives in the name of simple 
comparisons to suit a broader narrative of decolonization and post colonialism. We can, 
however, look at the connection between these two regions in light of their similarities and 
differences and ascertain any kind of lesson that could be learned from these situations to 
understand the extent of global trends and emerging norms in a globalized, postcolonial world 
with regards to compromised identities. If a model of looking at decolonization and 
compromised identities can be formulated, this brings us a step closer to understanding the post-
colonial world and furthering development agenda that is useful for the international community. 
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This chapter will set out to draw a connection between the present situation in Kashmir and the 
potential future of Eastern Ukraine through their compromised identity politics and the idea of 
the Postcolonial Informal Empire – an effect of not only successor states and their spheres of 
influence, but a continuation of imperial structures. First, the present situation of Kashmir will be 
considered: defining if Kashmir a frozen conflict and what this could mean for Ukraine. Next, I 
will turn to the problem of Eastern Ukraine and its potential future outcomes: do we have enough 
evidence to connect this region with Kashmir? Finally, a future of Ukraine will be drawn as a 
product of issues of decolonization and compromised identities – the combination of periphery, 
informal empire, challenged decolonization, and compromised identities are able to coalesce into 
violence. I will ultimately attempt to answer the primary issue at hand: Is the present-day 
Kashmir a snapshot of what Eastern Ukraine will look like?  
Setting up Kashmir 
 A crucial issue to both Eastern Ukraine and Kashmir is the presence of contested and 
compromised national identities – creating a source for dispute and a critical factor in the 
resolution of these conflicts. One cannot separate the problem of identity from the present 
situation in Kashmir and the uncertain future of Eastern Ukraine, as each group is engaged in a 
struggle for validation in their respective regions and even recognition in the international 
community. To dive into the problem of identity, we must look back to the overarching issue of 
decolonization as a driving force to these two tense situations. Kashmir is set within a larger 
question of the two-state partition of the British Raj, leading to the creation of Pakistan and India 
in 1947. The partition became a classic example of decolonization – the creation of two states, 
borders, and institutions as they became adopted into the dominant nation-state system, 
regardless of local realities and understandings of space and territory.   
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Subsequently, Kashmir found itself stuck between the artificially drawn borders of 
Pakistan and India. Pakistan was created as a homeland for South Asia’s large Muslim 
population, reflected in the institutional structures of the country while India was supposed to be 
the homeland for the Hindus but took on a more diverse, pluricentric model for their state. 
Jawaharlal Nehru questioned this idea of the two-state solution: “For if nationality is based on 
religion, there are many nations in India.77” India began to lay the foundation for a government 
that tried to fold in these issues of religion; Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and Muslims in 
addition to Hindus call the country home. India thus took a turn to secular nationalism – Indians 
are Indians, no matter the religion. The process of decolonization attempts to create a national 
identity in conversation with its colonial past while dealing with many of the classical issues 
inherent in identity politics. If we are to take the Constructivist logic of international politics that, 
“roles and identities are shaped by shared ideas, and reproduced and modified by ongoing 
interactions,78” then a strong tie can be created between India’s attempts at creating a national 
identity and the local realities of Kashmir. Identity born from the process of decolonization can 
be shaped as a catchall, especially in India’s case. This, however, has been challenged recently 
with the rise of Hindu nationalism in the national stage (with the election of a Hindu-nationalist 
party and subsequent rhetoric issued by the state) and on a more local level, even in Kashmir 
with elections reflecting this turn towards a Hindu-focused government – complicating the 
frozen status of the conflict79. Kashmir, however, is interesting in that it is a multi-religious 
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region whose territory is largely administered by India, with chunks under Pakistani and Chinese 
sovereignty. The government of India sees the continued control of Kashmir as an issue of grave 
importance, a test of its strength as an emerging nation. A failure to secure Kashmir as Indian 
would cause a domino effect in other hotspots across the country on the grounds of regional, 
political, religious, and ethno-linguistic differences.  
Kashmir has two layers that drive its status as a frozen conflict – the domestic issues 
within both Pakistani and Indian Kashmir and the international confrontations between Pakistan 
and India80. The internal problems of Kashmir stem from decolonization’s disastrous effects on 
identity by creating unanswerable and compromised identity politics. At the same time, 
decolonization reared its head in the problem of legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir: who has 
the right of control? India, Pakistan, and even a grassroots independence movement all claim to 
have sovereignty over a united Kashmir, subverting the drawn borders between India and 
Pakistan. 
Kashmir is one of Asia’s primary frozen conflicts that has persisted far beyond the days 
of partition and initial steps of decolonization: three wars have been fought between India and 
Pakistan since the partition and yet little has changed in regards to policy and local realities81. 
Starting in the 21st century, however, there seemed to have been a slow thaw in relations between 
New Delhi and Islamabad, along with renewed contact between Indian-administered Jammu and 
Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. This was first apparent 
in April 2005 when a bus service was created to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between 
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Srinagar in Indian Kashmir to Muzaffarabad in Pakistani Kashmir – sparking international 
attention and renewed hopes that this frozen conflict will soon be resolved. An important step 
forward for many in light of the war fought between India and Pakistan in 1999 across the LoC 
and the terrorist attacks in 2002 in New Delhi that resulted in heightened militarization in both 
India and Pakistan. The bus service reconnected the two lands, allowing those exiled to visit 
ancestral lands. Renewed talks in 2004 between India and Pakistan helped shape the next few 
years in the Kashmiri peace process.82 The international community praised this development, a 
simple bus line seems to have renewed optimism about the future of the conflict, with 
Condoleezza Rise noting that the administration was “very impressed with what India and 
Pakistan have achieved…It is quite remarkable when you see where they have reached. They 
opened the bus service in Kashmir, which would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. 
They are looking at broader economic ties.83”  
Optimism soon faded, however with a natural intervention: the great earthquake in 
October 2005 completely crippled Pakistan-administered Kashmir while the bus route between 
the two capitals dwindled to little more than a trickle. Since then, Kashmir fell back into its 
frozen conflict status: demonstrations in August 2008 sparked a redeployment of Indian troops to 
the region. Just a year before, Amnesty International charged the Indian government with 
violations of basic human rights, including systematic arrests, detentions, enforced curfews, and 
testimonies of rape and torture. Fresh protests sparked in 2010 due to the deaths of two young 
men who were detained by Indian forces resulted in the deaths of another 107 people. The next 
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month, India announced that it would release hundreds of students and young people arrested in 
the months of unrest.84  
Interstate conflict remains one of the defining features of the Kashmiri conflict: on one 
end is Pakistani interest for integrating all of Kashmir into its sovereignty while across the 
border, India views Kashmir as an integral part of its (officially) multi-ethnic, secular 
democracy. The LoC has remained one of the most contentious borders in the world, with 
conflict flaring up every few years or even sooner. Towards the end of 2014 and beginning of 
2015, India and Pakistan renewed the conflict with heavy cross-border fire and shelling forcing 
thousands of civilians to flee the area. No matter how many peace talks and processes have been 
started between the two countries, regardless of international mediation, the conflict continues to 
wage on.85   
This back and forth combined with internal strife has left the issue of Kashmir frozen – 
India and Pakistan are not actively engaged in a declared war while any sort of lasting peace 
agreements are nowhere to be found, bringing us to the present situation of Kashmir. With the 
election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 into the ruling majority party in India, under 
the leadership of Narendra Modi, a more nationalistic stance towards Kashmir from New Delhi 
has been forming. At the same time, local politics in Kashmir have mirrored this shift with BJP 
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taking 25 of the 87 available seats in the Muslim-majority region86. Separatists and militants in 
Indian Kashmir rejected the vote, with the militants stepping up attacks across the region in an 
attempt to intimidate potential voters. Now that the BJP has a controlling stake in national Indian 
politics and a powerful voice in local Kashmiri politics, the present situation in the region has 
become further complicated. BJP has in the past rejected Kashmir’s special status as an 
autonomous region – in fact, they believe that the regional parliament should be dissolved as part 
of a campaign to unite India. To do this, BJP would have to alter the very constitution of the 
country to remove special statutes granting Kashmir heightened autonomy. Currently, however, 
Prime Minister Modi seems to have shifted this policy to a stauncher stance on anti-terrorism and 
dealing with the mass numbers of refugees present in Kashmir.87 One statistic reported by the 
prime minister in an address to members of the Kashmiri Shia Muslim minority numbers the 
migrant population of Kashmir at 20 percent of the overall population of Kashmir – with the 
majority of these people being displaced due to terrorist activities on the part of the insurgency. 
To this end, the Indian military has stepped up its presence in Kashmir – much to the chagrin of 
Pakistan88.  
The insurgency plays a major role in the problem of solving Kashmir’s frozen conflict: 
major attacks or demonstrations staged by insurgent groups cause the Indian government to 
intervene further, prompting more major attacks and continuing the vicious cycle. The full-scale 
insurgency, consisting of numerous groups with conflicting goals, continues to take central stage 	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in Kashmir: India has dropped many of its political approaches to solving the issue, opting 
instead for mobilization of armed forces. By 1991, the Indian government adapted their military 
framework and flooded the region with somewhere between 600,000-700,000 personnel.  
India has not been the only power to assert itself in the greater Kashmir region, however. 
Separatist leaders have asserted the independence of Kashmir since the beginning of the partition 
process, asserting that the former princely state has a right to self-determination. The Azadi 
Kashmiri narrative has been critical of all sides involved in the conflict: “Today the so-called 
‘Azad’ (liberated) Kashmir has been occupied by Pakistani capitalists,89” wrote M. Bashir Asef, 
the Convener of the United Kashmir Liberation Front in 1971. Asef attacks Pakistan further, 
invoking narratives of decolonization used in the aftermath of partition, “Pakistani capitalism, 
which is a part of the international imperialism based on colonial exploitation, today is at a very 
dangerous juncture.90” In fact, he was not incorrect in this assertion: Pakistan’s focus has been on 
promoting dialogues of unity and demonizing Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, rather 
than a direct involvement in creating a foundation for a state in the aftermath of partition and 
after the LoC was established through the numerous Indo-Pakistani wars. Pakistan, however, has 
some direct similarities to the Ukrainian issue in the form of its infamous oligarchy – “Pakistan’s 
Kashmir strategy is now in a state of flux, though still dominated by a civil-military oligarchy 
that seems bent on forcibly altering the status-quo in Kashmir.91” Like much of Ukraine’s eastern 
provinces, select families and characters control Pakistani Kashmir. The rise of oligarchical 
societies can be a symptom of the post-colonial, decolonized world; indeed a similar situation is 
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also present in the Indian side of Kashmir. Article 370 of the Indian constitution was meant to 
give Jammu and Kashmir sweeping autonomy, a privilege that no other state in India has. The 
1970s saw an uptick in suspicion about this article, specifically because it seemed to only serve 
two purposes: further isolation of Kashmir within India and empowering the existing oligarchical 
power structure of 1000 or so families, which controlled much of Kashmiri politics “without fear 
of interference from New Delhi or other Kashmiris.92”   
Although both the Pakistani and Indian governments maintain that they are acting for the 
benefit of the overall population while demonizing each other's policies, few polls have been 
conducted to see what the Kashmiri people themselves actually think of their state vis-à-vis the 
two primary actors in the region. One wide-ranging poll conducted on both sides of the LoC 
attempts to give us some insights on the fault lines in Kashmir and could afford a certain glimpse 
at what Eastern Ukraine might look like if the region becomes further caught between two 
countries. 
 Independence garners a plurality of support from both sides of the LoC: 44 percent of 
Pakistani Kashmiris and 43 percent of Indian Kashmiris would prefer to see Kashmir as an 
independent state. On the other hand, twenty-one percent overall said that they would like to join 
India. This statistic is slightly misleading – only one percent of Pakistani Kashmiris voted for 
this, while the Hindu-majority Jammu overwhelmingly supported this move on the Indian side. 
Asef’s claims of colonialism in Azad Kashmir may have been wrong, as the poll also reported 
that fifty percent of residents on the Pakistani side of LoC support Kashmir joining Pakistan, 
while two percent on the Indian side back such a move93.  This tells us that identity and self-
determination are intimately related and further complicate the Kashmir problem as a 	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decolonized region. Decolonization brings out these issues of identity and allegiance, while 
ignoring the truths on the ground – control is not about the needs of the people, but about the 
needs of the state – the state must assert its rule in the power vacuum created by a withdrawing 
empire. The Princely State of Kashmir was not given the opportunity to act in self-determination, 
thus it was torn and became a part of two different successor states with differing views and 
missions. This has allowed for India and Pakistan to joust over Kashmir, conflagrating the issue 
into an international dispute. The added dimension of nuclear capabilities and near-constant 
cross-border confrontations has drawn international attention to the frozen conflict, even when 
India and Pakistan begin to deliberate opening conversations for compromise. “As India and 
Pakistan gingerly re-open the door to negotiation, this poll suggests that for millions of 
Kashmiris there is an overwhelming desire for peace, and a peace in which they can fully 
participate.94”   
The true danger of other nations becoming the "next Kashmir" stems from the inability 
for successor states to compromise over stretches of land left over from empire that do not easily 
fit into particular categories in either ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. Kashmir transcends 
the partition on the basis of Muslim and Hindu, as the self-identification of kashmiriyat 
demonstrates. These complicated issues of identity become ever more difficult to address if 
placed into a context where a previous power structure (i.e. colonial rule) suddenly is dismantled. 
The successors to this system are then charged with undoing the damage done, but this seems to 
simply not happen - at least in a way that ends in any sort of agreement. We can see how the 
issue of Kashmir turns from a heated war into a simmering status quo, and draw parallels to other 
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problematic regions in the world that are only just beginning to show symptoms of challenged 
decolonization, where the problems are simply thrown into the fire to explode into conflict. 
The Ukrainian dilemma 
The current situation in Kashmir is stuck between a rock and a hard place, and this could 
be very telling about the future of Eastern Ukraine. As we turn to the analysis of a theoretical 
future rooted in the issues of decolonization and compromised identities, we can separate the 
issues in terms of the near future and what the possible reality of Ukraine years down the line 
may be: the conclusion of the issue may not be an end at all; instead, Ukraine’s eastern oblasts 
are starting to resemble the frozen conflict of Kashmir – and this will not bode well for peaceful 
transitions from colonial to a decolonized modern society. Problems such as where Eastern 
Ukraine fits in the region will undoubtedly dominate the discourse between not only Ukraine and 
Russia, but with international actors and Eastern Europe as a whole. The issues of Eastern 
Ukraine could very well simmer into the tension we can observe in present-day Kashmir. An 
article published in October 2014 in Reuters outlines that the future of Eastern Ukraine – the 
Donetsk Basin – is a European Kashmir, where Ukraine, separatists, and Russia will engage in a 
tug-of-war for control95. Ukraine as a postcolonial, decolonized nation-state has experienced 
similar issues to those faced by India and Pakistan in creating, forming, and promoting the 
foundations for a functioning national governing apparatus. Taking Kashmir as the primary 
source of comparison for Eastern Ukraine, this section will compare the current situation in 
Kashmir with what is currently occurring in the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts in Eastern 
Ukraine, as a consequence of decolonization.  
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The conflict in Eastern Ukraine has multiple dimensions, similarly to the issues of 
Kashmir. On the national level, the Ukrainian government based in Kiev does not accept a self-
administered referendum of independence carried out in the heavily Russified regions of Donetsk 
and Lugansk shortly after the election of a pro-European, pro-Ukrainian majority in Ukraine’s 
parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. The government in Kiev has been accused of fascism, anti-
Semitism, and anti-Russian sentiments, prompting an insurgency-like paramilitary response in 
the two eastern regions, prompting a declaration of independence for the People's Republic of 
Donetsk and the People's Republic of Lugansk. On the other hand, there is an international 
dimension of conflict between Russia, Ukraine, and (broadly speaking) the West. Ukraine has 
accused the Russian government of intervening in its eastern provinces, breaking its sovereignty 
and internationally recognized borders. In turn, Russia has accused the West of meddling in 
Ukrainian affairs, orchestrating the entire Maidan movement to destabilize the region to threaten 
Russian security interests. As a result, Russia has annexed the Crimea, a region historically 
associated with Russia and only transferred in the 1950s to Ukraine. Finally, the West views 
Russian provocation towards Ukraine as a threat to NATO nations and the European Union, all 
under the auspices of a despotic president - Vladimir Putin, prompting in economic sanctions and 
even military posturing from both all sides. One thing does remain clear, however: the problem 
of Eastern Ukraine transcends the Donbas region, as the war on the ground in Donetsk and 
Lugansk is felt by the Ukrainians who are conscripted from across the country to defend the 
father land, whose government tells them that their territories are threatened; by the Russians 
who feel their security is under attack; and the West that feels uneasy towards a robust form of 
Russian aggression.  
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The beginning of the current woes in Eastern Ukraine stems from the Maidan revolution 
– the replacing of the Yanukovych government in Kiev signaled that Eastern Ukraine might have 
lost its hold on the future of the country. The drama of the Maidan revolution spilled into the 
eastern portions of the country, where coal is the primary source of economy. The Donbas region 
has been particularly problematic, prompting an insurgency turned all out offensive war between 
the self-identified nations of Lugansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, and 
Ukraine. It would be important to note the historical narrative of the Donbas region, paying 
particular attention to how its status of being not only on the edge of the former Soviet and 
Russian empires, but also on the edge of modern Ukraine, has preempted the modern crisis. It is 
most telling to see how Russia, the dominant power in the region, sees the Donbas in addition to 
Ukrainian narratives and self-identification of the Eastern Ukrainians themselves. Indeed, 
President Vladimir Putin of Russia declared that not only the Donbas, but the whole of Southern 
and Eastern Ukraine (Novorossiya, New Russia) are intimately part of the Russian sphere: 
what was called Novorossiya back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, 
Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. The territories 
were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows. They 
were won by Potyomkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The 
center of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost 
these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.96 
 
Vladimir Vladimirovich makes an interesting point: Does Ukraine have a claim on the Donbas, 
or are they simply as colonizing as the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union? History tells us 
that this is not the case: the Donbas has been home to a distinct Ukrainian narrative for centuries, 
centering primarily on the Zaporozhian Cossacks, while the term Novorossiya was created by an 
imperial expansion reminiscent of New Amsterdam or New France colonial heritages. Looking 
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closer, the heavily urbanized centers of the Donbas are surrounded by a landscape distinctly 
Ukrainian, steeped in a nationalistic Ukrainian history. Donetsk and Lugansk were claimed as 
part of an independent Ukraine during the Russian Civil War. Now that the Ukrainian question 
has been contextualized, the problem of the Maidan can be thoroughly discussed as it pertains to 
the future of Eastern Ukraine as an integral part of the nation. The Maidan revolution saw a mass 
mobilization unseen since the 2004 Orange Revolution, resulting in a regime change. This has 
since sparked outrage and separatist insurgencies in the eastern portions of the country, 
prompting intervention by Russia and a series of economic and geopolitical actions that 
heightened uneasiness between the West and Russia. This also preempted a physical intervention 
by Russia on behalf of the Russian-speaking majority in the Crimea, resulting in the occupation 
and integration of the region into the Russian Federation – a move contested by much of the 
West and heavily disputed by Ukraine. These issues are not located in a vacuum; the actions of 
Russia, Ukraine, and the West have been building as a result of historical colonization and a 
messy period of decolonization that further fractured and compromised national, ethnic, and 
religious identities within Ukraine. This story seems familiar – a narrative played across the 
world time and time again, but lessons may finally be learned from the regions already in the 
process of decolonization and those that are finally beginning to feel just how bumpy the road to 
the postcolonial may be.  
Decolonizing identity  
 This project seeks to understand the issues of decolonization and compromised identities 
as a result of a historical narrative and as a point for “lessons learned.” If there can be a 
conceptualization of decolonization and compromised identities, lines may be drawn across the 
globe to connect and understand problems facing postcolonial regions, and identify markers of 
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emerging troubles. Historicizing Kashmir may give us the tools we need to tread carefully in 
Ukraine, focusing on the real problems at hand rather than attempting to define Ukraine’s 
problems as novel or surprising. Decolonization is a messy process, oftentimes ignoring issues 
exacerbated by or even directly created by colonial rule. We can begin to do this by tethering 
compromised identities and the problem of forging a nationality Both Ukraine and Kashmir are 
currently in the midst of a certain identity crisis, but Kashmir makes for an interesting as it has 
been experiencing the effects of decolonization and compromised identities for some time now, 
while Ukraine’s crisis is only beginning to unfold as it moves away from the former metropolitan 
center. It may very well be possible that certain lessons can be learned from Kashmir’s 
experiences in order to better understand subsequent waves of unrest across the globe. It may 
also be telling that Kashmir has yet to reach a status quo that does of include violence, 
insurgency, and continued clashes based on identities that have been compromised due to 
decolonization. What could be at the heart of both of these identity crises, steeped in history but 
very much relevant, and evolving in the present-day? Decolonization requires successor states to 
build institutions and decide not only the structure of the nation but also the historical identity 
narrative.  
Nations are created based on principles of unity and the identification of the people as 
part of this nation – nation-building is in the business of fostering an identity in order to smooth 
the process of maintaining institutions and gaining support from the population. It is without a 
surprise that there are numerous aspects of decolonization that are common between Kashmir 
and unfolding actions in Ukraine. When faced with an insurrection, the Maharajah Hari Singh 
chose to ascend to India instead of forming an independent state – since then, the process of 
removing British colonial rule has been fraught with interstate wars and intrastate insurrections. 
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India-administered Jammu and Kashmir then came to enjoy a certain “privileged” status within 
India as an autonomous state in an attempt to maintain a Kashmiri identity that has been in the 
region for centuries beforehand, “Accession to India was conditional on Kashmir retaining its 
distinct cultural and regional identity. Article 370 assured the state all benefits of independent 
Kashmir without sacrificing the advantages of being a part of the larger Indian federation.” 
Instead, the constitutional amendment guaranteeing Kashmir its special status has come under 
fire, both within Kashmir and in Indian national politics. This sort of guarantee by a state for 
maintaining identities can be seen in many decolonizing regions, notably in Ukraine. After 
decades of Russification, the Ukrainian constitution attempts to reassert the Ukrainian identity in 
the nation by privileging the language as the only official language, while guaranteeing minority 
language support – with sizable Russian-speakers in the South and East of the country, this was a 
sort of slap in the face. Much like the Indian constitution alienates Kashmiri Muslims in 
guaranteeing the rights of the Kashmiri identity in a nation created for Hindus, the Russian-
speakers in Ukraine were alienated as a result of finding themselves in an independent 
Ukrainian-majority nation (no longer receiving guaranteed privilege of Russian status by the 
metropolitan center in Moscow).  
Identities are compromised in part by the very process of decolonization, the process of 
transition, and the creation of a national identity. Although Kashmir is not fully independent, 
these very issues arise in both dependent-Kashmir and an (internationally recognized) 
independent Ukraine. This profound split in identity has a strong influence on transitioning from 
colonial dependency to any semblance of independence. Ukraine in particular interesting, 
especially when considering the woes of the decolonized in other regions of the world – 
“Ukraine represents probably the most ambiguous case, being neither a clear-cut success story – 
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like its postcommunist neighbors to the west, nor a complete failure – like its neighbors to the 
east.97” This dicey transition, Riabchuk posits, is due to a “muddling through” of national identity 
– an idea that can be identified in Kashmir as well. Kashmir’s muddling through of identity 
stems from factions that grew out of the British plan for partition of its colonies: separate nations 
for the Muslim and Hindu populations, separate homelands. This was supposed to fix the 
problem of identity, offering a compromise for rising nationalism, but the compromise ran into a 
problem in Kashmir. The community was multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic – but 
still under the name of Kashmir and having a Kashmiri identity. Kashmiriyat, driven by the first 
prime minister of Indian Jammu and Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah, “redefined existing national 
identities that were previously delineated along religious and ethnic boundaries.98” In addition, 
this encompassing identity was able to fold in different peculiarities of the region, including 
refusal to support Pakistani insurgents in the Second Indo-Pakistan War and the variance of 
success for Muslim nationalism in Kashmir compared to Pakistan. It is interesting to note that 
this Kashmiri identity circumvents issues in such a way that Ukraine has not been able to foster. 
Ukrainian nationalism stems from a historical narrative of Ukrainian-speakers, mostly from the 
west of the country (where Greek Catholicism and Ukrainian Orthodoxy are in the majority) over 
the Russian-speaking east (where Russian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian churches subordinate to the 
Moscow patriarchate are in the majority) built the modern identity of Ukraine and Ukrainianness. 
Sheikh Abdullah attempted to build a new nationalism, irrespective of the reality that both India 
and Pakistan did not represent the voice of the Kashmiri people. Ukraine, for that matter, did not 
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build a new identity but rather followed a nationalistic turn aimed at reasserting and privileging 
the long-suppressed Ukrainian identity in an independent nation.  
In the process of decolonization, we can see a divergent path emerging in how the 
establishment of a nationality can play out. Kashmiriyat, even for its task of circumventing the 
issues of compromised identities, has yet to gain a foothold. Does this mean that a new national 
identity in Ukraine would also be ineffective? There is some support for this conjecture, as the 
Old Russian imperial regime first attempted to build the Eastern Slavic identity. The Eastern 
Slavic project tied Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians together as an identity with tethered 
histories and cultures. Regardless of the language spoken, these groups were related by their 
religion (Eastern Orthodoxy) and by their proximity to the Russian metropoly. The successive 
Soviet regime emphasized nationalities and an identity structure similar to the Eastern Slavic 
identity – one may identify as Ukrainian, but that only means that they are intimately related to 
Russians and Belarusians. We can apply this to the independence of Ukraine: although an 
overwhelming majority voted for independence in 1991, the majority of Ukrainians elected ex-
Communist leader Leonid Kravchuk as the nation’s first president – a break from the past was 
not entirely called for. The lesson from Kashmir’s problems of marrying identity with 
decolonization is a problem for the future of Ukraine vis-à-vis the nation’s current woes in 
Donetsk and Lugansk. The creation of a new identity still cannot undo entrenched identities that 
have been placed at odds with each other. In the process of decolonizing, Kashmir’s identities 
were compromised because of the interstate conflict between India and Pakistan, while Ukraine’s 
identities became compromised after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but the continuation of 
Russian identification in the country. The common thread is that decolonization helps 
compromise identities, which in turn hampers the process of building a national identity that can 
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subvert colonial rule. In both cases of Kashmir and Ukraine, an issue of existing on the periphery 
of informal empires that have succeeded the classical colonial empire can to be at the center of 
troubles in decolonization and establishing a nationality that can fuse compromised identities.  
Life on the periphery: Rise of informal empires 
 A major commonality between Ukraine and Kashmir is that they are both affected by the 
rise of non-Western powers – Russia and India, respectively. The lessons gathered from Kashmir 
in order to build an image of the future of Ukraine could be traced back the rise of India (and 
subsequently Russia) as a Postcolonial Informal Empire (PIE)99. India inherited the status of a 
large, emerging power after the British Empire withdrew, while Russia inherited the same from 
the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The PIE differs from formal empires in a fundamental 
way: the structures of authority in the PIE allow for equality between all citizens. These polities 
emerged as successors to the empires they came from, as a result of direct colonial intervention, 
where an elite ruling class emerged that were either directly sent from the metropolitan center or 
an emerging local ruling class set into place by the colonial power. These elites began to 
maintain empire-like control in a different way than their colonial predecessors by attempting to 
form a national identity and partake in “people building” activities that encompassed and 
acknowledged different ethnicities and religions, but focused on a single identity. These 
practices, however, seem to have ended in a similar result. The rise of PIEs creates issues 
reminiscent of those found in formal empires of the past: peripheral states have an oftentimes-
complicated relationship to the core of power, a relationship that creates a relationship where the 
periphery is reliant on or forcibly bound to the center. This connection results in a set of 
problems, notably conflict with the center and an exacerbation of conflicts of identity. Kashmir’s 	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relationship to New Delhi, for example, is steeped in issues of control and denial of plebiscites 
for independence promised by international organizations. This brings up a fundamental 
question: 
How do the territories and people in the periphery, often with a distinct sense of ethno-
nationalism defined in opposition to the majoritarian nationalism, relate to the 
center/core? This relation is imperial. It is based on territorial conquest/liberation in the 
recent past; on subjugation of the distinct groups of people and appropriation of their 
history, identity, life, and death as part of the grand story of one unified polity; on an 
asymmetry of power maintained through coercion and consent100. 
 
For Jammu and Kashmir, this meant a direct relationship with India while Pakistan-administered 
Kashmir also has this sort of complicated history. What lessons could be learned for the future of 
different regions on the periphery and how the complicated relationship of the Postcolonial 
Informal Empire enflames identity problems?  
 A large part of Indian rhetoric towards Kashmir deals with asserting the region as an 
integral part of the greater multiethnic, secular state; thus it denies any sort of role as a 
colonizing power. The PIE’s “identity is formed around a sense of being a victim of Western 
imperialism101;” India views Kashmiri issues as an internal question while defining itself in a 
moral high ground (particularly in relation to Pakistan). We can see this framing of India’s status 
as far back as Gandhi’s nonviolence and Nehru’s nonalignment – the state of India avoids direct 
connection to older imperialistic regimes fostered by British dominance. This also includes 
folding Kashmir into the greater narrative of history constructed in the aftermath of British rule: 
India celebrates thousands of years of continuity and plurality, meaning that Kashmir fits into the 
puzzle of greater India with all of its unique features. As for Kashmir in the state-level, 
Kashmiriyat identity and people-building activities work to do the same thing. The identity 
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works to construct a narrative that fights opposition, but the buck stops at a certain point. Indian 
national security and the issue of national interests take precedence, regardless of local identity-
building activities.  
If there is an alternative narrative, why has the violence continued in Kashmir and across 
borders? The answer lies in the very construction of Kashmiriyat identity vis-à-vis Indian 
nationalism – the center (Hindu India) becomes majoritarian while the Kashmiri identities 
(Muslim, Pandit, Kashmiriyat) takes on the role of a minority on the periphery. The “unity in 
diversity” of the Indian and Kashmiri narratives is born from a majoritarian identity – the Hindu 
identity within India, for example, becomes codified as normative while all other identities are 
recognized as different or “Other.” Thus, we have an imperialist flavor of India as a postcolonial 
nation. Kashmiri resistance then focuses not on the reconstruction of India as a whole, but on 
reforms as a peripheral region, one that has become the other in the nation. The struggle for 
Kashmir is about ethno-nationalism, development, and livelihood. India’s response is then to 
assert its control over Kashmir, because this Other is rebelling against the majoritarian center, 
threatening security. We can see this in the passing of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act: if a 
region is proclaimed as “disturbed” the Indian armed forces are given special powers in the 
region that include searches without warrants, arrests without warrants, and even killings if there 
is a due cause. This applies to other regions in the periphery of India – but only in the 
peripheries, because it is these regions that give India the most trouble. On the Pakistani side, 
similar issues have arisen: the peripheral states of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan are denied 
self-determination and are under supervision of the Pakistani government and intelligence 
community, resulting in searches and killings. Gilgit-Baltistan is particularly interesting because 
it serves as an opposite case of Kashmir: the region does not hold constitutional recognition in 
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Pakistan, while Kashmir receives special autonomous status, but ending in both regions 
subjected to direct intervention by the metropolitan center.102 These issues are then worsened by 
the continued violence that occurs regionally and internationally. For PIEs, the issue is 
convincing the nation’s elite and majoritarian center that the state can act effectively to defend 
security interests; and in the case of India, fight extremism and insurgency. As long as the frozen 
conflict between India and Pakistan continues, gross negligence of human rights and the 
continued compromising of identity will perpetuate in a vicious circle. 
 Should we then treat these issues much like their colonial predecessors? Is framing these 
issues as exacerbated and continued thanks to Postcolonial Informal Empires the answer to 
solving the problems? We can attempt to apply the logic of the PIE to Eastern Ukraine, a region 
that is legally a part of Ukraine but very much a periphery (as with the rest of Ukraine) of 
Russia’s informal empire. The crisis stems from the rhetorical analogy that Russia is in the 
position of an “older brother” to Ukraine, the “younger sister” – resulting in a peripheral, 
paternalistic relationship between Ukraine and the metropolitan center in Moscow. The ability 
for Russia to manipulate Ukrainian politics and identity gives it a certain power that is familiar in 
the Kashmiri question: India’s relationship to Kashmir and Russia’s relationship to Ukraine are 
not so different. Indeed when faced with Europeanization of Ukraine, Russia has reacted to 
defend its position as the primary actor; that Ukraine falls in its sphere of influence. A parallel 
can be drawn to the actions of India to maintain control in Kashmir through legislative and 
military procedures. Russia has even prepared legislation that it can legally enter Ukraine if it 
needs to defend its security interests, bypassing any sort of international legal framework. This 
has also resulted in Russian involvement in “protecting the rights of Russian speakers and 
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Russian citizens in other countries, which has resulted in framing the world as bipolar.103,104” 
There are those who are Russian-speaking and connected to the historical Russian narrative and 
the “Others” that are, by default, against Russian interests. Ukraine is then put into a position that 
it is either with Russia as its ethnic (Slavic) and historical (Kievan Rus’) sibling, or it is against 
it. The second option comes with the consequence that Russia then views its citizens or those 
who are ethnically Russian as in danger. If this calculus continues, Russia will begin to act less 
and less like a border between Eastern Ukraine and Southern Russia exists, and will treat it as a 
dependent and permeable (but independent) region, in the same vein as Kashmir’s relationship to 
India.  
 The Maidan revolution placed an emphasis in Ukraine on being fundamentally different 
than Russia; that the historical narrative presented by a united Eastern Slavic identity is not 
entirely accurate, and in fact erases the entire history of a unique Ukrainian ethnicity, religious 
tradition, and language. This outraged and prompted a crisis in Eastern Ukraine, but can we see 
Eastern Ukraine evolving into a Kashmir? Yes and no: Ukraine is, for all intents and purposes, a 
legally independent country that emerged through a referendum to leave the Soviet Union. 
Kashmir has been denied such rights for a plebiscite since Partition. This means that Ukraine’s 
actions are more independent, that the nation has the ability to sign treaties with the European 
Union, for example – only to deal with the consequences from Russia as an interstate conflict 
rather than an intrastate one. This is important consideration in using Kashmir as an example for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Valery V. Kravchenko, "Російсько-українська криза 2014 р.: причини, характер, наслідки" 
(working paper, Donetsk National University, 2015), 3. Translation: Russian-Ukrainian Crisis, 
2014: Causes, Nature, Implications. Translation my own, from the original Ukrainian.  
104 "Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad," Washington Post, 
last modified March 18, 2014, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-
russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html Translation my 
own from original Russian.  
	   78 
Eastern Ukraine’s future, as the nation in which it is a part of can appeal for support while 
Kashmir cannot. However, this is if Eastern Ukraine is defined as a part of greater Ukraine, 
something that the secessionist movements in the Donetsk and Lugansk vehemently deny. To 
them, the illegitimacy of the new Kiev government and the Eastern Slavic connection of Eastern 
Ukraine to the Russian polity does not fit into the nationalist united Ukrainian rhetoric, how can 
they if the Russian speakers of Eastern Ukraine cannot even understand the national language 
based from the western portions of the country. The leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic 
and Lugansk People’s Republic see the Kiev government as a product of Bandera nationalism, 
based on the highly controversial figure Stepan Bandera105. The two breakaway governments 
view Ukrainian politics and culture as foreign to them, as an import from nationalistic tendencies 
of other regions in the country. There is nostalgia in this part of Ukraine, and among other 
breakaway regions in the postcommunist world for the Soviet Union – where national questions 
were suppressed by the nomenklatura in favor of a New Soviet Man, for example106. A similar 
strain of historical nostalgia is ever-present in Kashmir as well, where the idea of self-
determination continues to drive the overall conflict – denial of plebiscite by both India and 
Pakistan combined with an ever-present military conflict leave the situation with few options.  
These issues can be framed as a product of challenged decolonization – where the right 
for self-determination and autonomy has been denied even in the vacuum left by a colonial 
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power. For Ukraine, the problem stems from the presence of Russia and the country’s proximity 
to the informal empire – even as Ukrainians attempt to build institutions and move away from 
Soviet rule. Kashmir’s past experiences of attempting to fight for self-determination while other 
movements have hijacked such practices has resulted in violent outbursts and a systematic 
curtailment of human rights, setting Kashmiris back even further in their quest for decolonization 
while pinning identities at odds with each other. Ukraine is currently experiencing similar fallout 
from its own challenged decolonization: Ukrainians are now fractured into different factions, 
each hijacking the Ukrainian narrative to fit their own needs and missions, whether they 
demonize the Maidan revolution in Kiev or deny the validity referendums in Donetsk, Lugansk, 
and Crimea. These groups and their identity politics are a result of a process of decolonization 
that has been anything but smooth, the bumpy path towards a united Ukraine seems to be taking 
a shape resembling the long and complicated path of decolonization in Kashmir. The very 
location and historical narrative of both Ukraine and Kashmir has turned these regions into 
particularly difficult situations to fix. On one hand, Ukraine is stuck between the 
Europeanization of its country and the heavily Russified/Sovietized past. On the other, Kashmir 
is stuck between a complete denial of its rights to self-determination and a disastrous insurgency 
that has devastated human rights. For now, the Ukrainian conflict has largely stayed localized to 
Donetsk and Lugansk, with new agreements attempting to keep an uneasy ceasefire. However, 
will Ukraine follow in Kashmir’s footsteps and erode into a conflict that will not only include 
intrastate actors but interstate ones as well?  
Violent means to an uncertain end 
Decolonization and compromised identities are issues that do not simply occupy the 
theoretical sphere to be discussed in universities and think tanks. These problems manifest 
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themselves on the streets of Srinagar and Kiev, in the border regions, and in the very policies that 
are prolonging the conflicts. Ukraine’s place in the Russia’s Postcolonial Informal Empire 
coupled with a history of colonization and pitting identities against each other has created a 
conflict that is beginning to resemble that of Kashmir’s post-Partition reality. The Anti-Terrorist 
Operation underway in Eastern Ukraine has disrupted the lives of millions and killed thousands – 
what is being seen is an insurgency, a revolt, and a conflict along ideological, ethnic, and 
linguistic ties that is intensified by international pressures. Neither political violence nor its 
underlying factors can be confined to theory – but we can use examples of other experiences to 
attempt to make sense of what is happening across the globe.  
We can see attempts at analyzing the Ukrainian crisis in the current literature: John 
Mearsheimer introduces the idea that the Ukrainian crisis may not be the fault of Vladimir 
Vladimirovich, but actually an effect of Western expansion through NATO to the traditional 
lands falling under Russian influence107. The imperial undertones of such a statement are 
immediately seen – Ukraine is simply a buffer between greater powers, but can this really be the 
future of the region? The past of Kashmir is in a similar position, as the region is situation in the 
periphery of India, Pakistan, and even China. Wars have been fought over the region in order to 
secure Kashmir, but the same cannot be said about Ukraine just yet, but the current situation in 
both Kashmir and Eastern Ukraine are telling.  
Violence is a means to an end: factions in Kashmir have used violent means for 
independence (or in India and Pakistan’s cases, to maintain control), Islamic fundamentalism, 
against state tyranny, and so on. Now, Ukrainian factions are looking for very similar ends: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault," Foreign Affairs, accessed 
April 19, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-
ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault. 
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independence for Donetsk and Lugansk, maintaining control for the government in Kiev, and the 
unification or collapse of a country. These issues are not located in a vacuum where they are 
exclusively problems of great power politics or a problem of challenged decolonization and 
compromised identities; it is in fact a combination of these problems. Great power politics 
informs the way colonization functions (or becomes unrealized), which in turn aggravates 
identity politics that have been compromised during a long history of colonization and 
manipulation. This has created the problem of a next Kashmir: Eastern Ukraine is in such a 
position that any party involved cannot simply ignore it – the Ukrainian government in Kiev 
seeks territorial integrity (all the more since the annexation of Crimea by Russia), separatists in 
the east seek independence for Russian-speakers, Russia seeks to maintain its political economic 
supremacy in Eastern Europe, and the European Union seeks to secure its eastern countries while 
following a principle of expansion. Kashmir has been in a stalemate combined with wars to 
maintain the status quo, and the same may be seen in Donetsk and Lugansk. The tug-of-war for 
Eastern Ukraine will not end in a clean solution, but this is expected after years of decolonization 
and compromised identities: Ukraine as a nation, like Kashmir as a region, was drawn by 
colonization that has not worn off and this has created conflict and stratification among the 
citizenry. Although Ukrainians sing that their nation has not yet perished, the issues at hand 
speak to a grimmer future for the nation of Ukraine. Like in Kashmir, very real symptoms of 
decolonization have not been addressed which has triggered conflict and precipitated human 
rights violations. The lessons from Kashmir tell us to tread carefully when empires fade away, 
paying close attention to the political situations in regions where identities simply do not fit 
together like expected and waves of unrest clash against emerging regimes. A united Ukraine 
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may not survive for long as the challenged decolonization and the nation’s compromised 
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Conclusion 
Anything but war 
On the day I became Soviet leader, in March 1985, I had a special meeting with the leaders of 
the Warsaw Pact countries and told them: “You are independent, and we are independent. You 
are responsible for your policies, we are responsible for ours. We will not intervene in your 
affairs, I promise you.” 
-Mikhail Gorbachev 
 
 This project sought to examine the relationship between decolonization, identity, and 
conflict. Throughout this research, many differences as well as parallels cropped up that 
continued to problematize the effort to make meaningful connections. This brought the very idea 
of a comparative research project into question: English-speaking sources rejected the notion of a 
meaningful comparison of the Ukrainian experience to colonialism and subsequent 
decolonization. It was not until I tapped into Ukrainian academic sources that the picture began 
to come together in a way that was both meaningful and supported by previous academic 
research. The Ukrainian point of view fits into the greater puzzle of decolonization and the rise 
of conflict zones in the aftermath of colonial collapse – the parallels between the heavily 
researched Kashmir and the novel situation in Ukraine began to grow as I read through hundreds 
of pages of Ukrainian academic writing, all pointing to a postcolonial syndrome in the country.  
 It was because of this understanding of the Ukrainian conflict that I could finally begin to 
make an eloquent connection between Kashmir’s past, present status quo, and the future of 
Eastern Ukraine. The conclusion was not one I wanted to see: Kashmir was at the center of 
decades of conflict, including its status of a frozen conflict that entails cross-border shooting and 
gross violations of human rights regularly. Would Ukraine follow suit? It would depend on the 
reading of the evidence and the events that are unfolding daily in Ukraine. The Minsk II 
agreement signed in February of 2015 has kept an uneasy truce in the Donbas, with only 
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occasional artillery fire or clashes; however, the leaders of both the Donetsk People’s Republic 
and the Lugansk People’s Republic have expressed their doubt in the stability of the truce. The 
Minsk II protocol outlines stipulations that are reminiscent of the Simla Agreement meant to 
keep peace in Kashmir: Ukraine is to approve a new constitution that will grant sweeping 
autonomy for Donetsk and Lugansk, effectively instituting a federalization of the country. In 
addition, Ukraine would gain control of all borders to monitor the transference of foreign 
weaponry and personnel out of the country with representatives from the OSCE108. Like the 
Simla Agreement, the Minsk II agreement involving leaders from the European Union, Russia, 
Ukraine, and the separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, has also established a ceasefire line, while 
guaranteeing Ukrainian services in the region in a way that is similar to Indian control over most 
of Jammu and Kashmir in the aftermath of consecutive wars.  
 The primary findings of this project are valuable and raise further questions for research 
and discovery about challenged decolonization, compromised identities, and the emergence of 
conflict zones. One of the most useful deductions from this project is the effect of a nation or 
region in the periphery of a Postcolonial Informal Empire: both Kashmir and Ukraine find 
themselves under the influence of successor states to large empires and centers of control. New 
Delhi retains powerful control and influence over a large part of South Asia and the former 
British Raj, while Moscow wields power over much of Central Asia, the Caucuses, and Eastern 
Europe. These nations are instrumental in the future of Kashmir and Ukraine, whether they like it 
or not.  
The significance of this comparison is how we will handle not only these conflicts, but 
also others that find themselves under influence or control of an informal empire. It is worth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 "Ukraine ceasefire: New Minsk agreement key points," BBC News, last modified February 
12, 2015, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513. 
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noting that the other nations of the former Soviet Union have also felt similar effects of informal 
empire, most notably Georgia, which endured a direct invasion from Russia. Other nations in 
South Asia are heavily influenced by India, including Sri Lanka and Nepal. It is important to 
tread carefully when approaching bubbling conflicts because the neighborhood may not take well 
to an unstable nation in the backyard of a powerful imperial state.  
 The next insight from this research was outlining the importance of historicizing and 
contextualizing both Kashmir and Ukraine, as it is impossible to consider certain occurrences as 
having nothing to do with the past or the context in which these events occur. The conflict in 
these regions, although comparable, must be appreciated as intimately connected to their own 
realities and the histories leading up to such events. Kashmir, for example, was promised a 
plebiscite but did not receive one because of the wars between India and Pakistan, followed by a 
strong insurgency gave India the authority to circumvent all of these promises and even pass 
special laws that curtailed human rights in the region.  
Eastern Ukraine’s referendums, although illegal by both Ukrainian and international 
standards, occurred in a country that did not have the power to prevent them. While Kashmir is 
controlled by a state that has the capacity and the strength to impose laws while Eastern Ukraine 
is in a nation that simply does not have those capabilities. It is dangerous to compare apples and 
oranges, but it is helpful to consider both as fruits for comparison.  
Looking wider, considering Ukraine as a periphery to Russia brings the comparison 
closer to Kashmir’s relationship with India. Russia has the ability to violate international borders 
and annex entire provinces because of its position as the successor state to the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, India’s position allows it to define Kashmir’s stability and institute martial law in the 
name of security. There is a history leading up to these events that cannot be forgotten: Kashmir 
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was once a princely state, while Ukraine did not achieve a fully independent nation-state status 
until the fall of the Soviet Union; in inter-war periods a revolutionary independent Ukraine 
emerged only to be cut off within a few months. These events inform the way identities are 
created and framed in a given place, from Kashmir’s Kashmiriyat to a new Ukrainian identity.  
 In the same vein, this project identified key areas of Kashmiri and Ukrainian identity 
politics that have been compromised and situated those events in a broader context. For Kashmir, 
the story is well known: Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists share the land. The Partition and 
creation of new Hindu and Muslim homelands put Kashmir in a position with only two options, 
both of which would end in conflict. Ukrainian identity is compromised in levels as a response to 
its historical ties to Russia and Central Europe: religion, language, and regional differences each 
has an impact on the discourse of national identity. On one hand, the West-East divide is well 
known and reported on in the rest of the world. On the other, the politics of internal borders, 
language policies, and religions are little understood and go unexamined in the broader literature. 
The problem of Ukraine’s internal borders resembles those of Kashmir’s demarcations between 
Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. Eastern Ukraine’s demography is vastly different than the 
Western core of Galicia and even Central Ukraine’s dyke pole109. The line between these regions 
is as blurred as the borders of Kashmir and these regions become difficult to count as 
“belonging” to one group or the other.  
Ukraine’s language policies, however, are unique in that the language of a person is 
highly tied to a history of sociopolitical disenfranchisement and self-identification. The status of 
Ukrainian as an official language, as a sole official language is deliberate and significant, 
compared to the fluid linguistic borders in Kashmir. The very idea that Russian would not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Dyke Pole refers to Ukraine’s heartland, stretching across much of today’s portions of central, 
southern, and eastern Ukraine.  
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given special status wreaked havoc in many parts of Ukraine, where the language is spoken by 
most of the population, and even prompted Russia to threaten on the behalf of Russian-speakers 
in the country. Meanwhile, Ukrainian has always enjoyed a certain prestige in western portions 
of the country.  
Religion in Ukraine is also valuable when compared to Kashmir’s conflict along ethnic 
and religious lines. Ukraine’s religious politics are highly fragmented, especially in their 
relations with the Moscow Patriarchate of the Eastern Orthodox Church, but these differences are 
shadowed by the overall identification of these groups as Eastern Orthodox. Moscow only 
recognizes one Ukrainian Orthodox Church, while other splinter groups that have a high number 
of followers are branded heretics; Western Ukraine also has a high proportion of Greek 
Catholics, a completely different vein of Christianity, causes tension in the region. The Crimean 
Tatars in the south of the country are Muslim, while there is still a percentage of Ukrainians who 
identify as Jews, Georgian Orthodox, and Armenians. This religious diversity complicates the 
story in Ukraine, but not to the extent of all out violence. Both Ukrainians and Russians, for 
example, use Anti-Semitism, as a rhetorical device in order to frame the other in a negative light 
to the West.  
 Future scholarship on the subject of challenged decolonization and compromised 
identities should focus on the connection between the two as they pertain to other fields, 
especially economic. The political economic realities of both Kashmir and Ukraine have much to 
do with the way the conflicts are handled by the involved parties: Kashmir’s water sources and 
Ukraine’s coal and gas pipelines are among the drivers for conflict and the unwillingness of 
many of the involved parties to seek a solution through compromise. One cannot ignore the 
intricacies of economy and how identity and the creation of institutions through decolonization 
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interact with the rise of conflicts. There is also the issue of the successor state: informal empires 
are not simply created because of a large land area; they are created because of deep economic 
roots stemming from former empires. Further research must also be considered in the public 
opinions of these regions: would Kashmir become independent and would Eastern Ukraine fully 
succeed? If Kashmir stays in India while Eastern Ukraine votes for sovereignty, how would that 
change the way we view these conflicts?  
 If we accept that Kashmir and Ukraine are comparable enough to draw meaningful 
connections and make informed predictions, the future of Eastern Ukraine and Ukraine as a 
whole do not look bright. The aftermath of Partition in South Asia sparked successive war 
between two fledgling nations, many of which were directly over the status of Kashmir. 
Although the succession and annexation of the Crimean peninsula did not prompt a war between 
Ukraine and Russia, the successful succession of Donetsk and Lugansk from Ukraine and 
annexation by Russia would lead to greater conflict. Now that the West is involved in the 
Ukrainian crisis, the likelihood of conflict could rise, as tensions remain high between Western 
NATO-aligned nations and Russia. Kashmir’s problems stem from decolonization that has 
caused identity politics to crest into conflict, a similar story is forming in Ukraine. It is important 
to monitor the developments in Ukraine, as if they follow the Kashmiri narrative, the country is 
in for decades of instability and conflict. Kashmir’s issues and violence have been center stage 
for decades, while the true extent of Ukraine’s is only now unfolding. The international 
community has a chance to correct some of their mistakes in handling these kinds of conflicts in 
a meaningful way. For now, Ukraine may very well become the next Kashmir if lessons remain 
unlearned and the next steps in solving the Ukrainian crisis do not take into account the 
devastating effects of challenged decolonization and compromised identity politics. 
	   89 
Bibliography 
Acharya, Amitav, and Arabinda Acharya. "Kashmir in the International System." In Kashmir: 
New Voices, New Approaches, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and 
Cyrus Samii. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 
  
Ahmed, Naeem. "India's Changing Policy on Kashmir." Pakistan Horizon 53, no. 4 (October 
2000). 
  
Anand, Dibyesh. "China and India: Postcolonial Informal Empire in the Emerging Global 
Order." Rethinking Marxism 24, no. 1 (January 2012). 
  
"Holodomor: Memories of Ukraine's Silent Massacre," November 22, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25058256. 
  
Arakotaram, Karan. "The Rise of Kashmiriyat: People-Building in 20th Century Kashmir." The 
Columbia Journal of South Asian Studies. 
  
 Are There Examples of Fragile States That Have Recovered? Accessed November 28, 2014. 
http://ffp.statesindex.org/faq-09-recovery. 
  




Asef, M. Bashir. "Azad Kashmir: A Colony of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan." Pakistan 
Horizon 2, no. 2 (November 1971). 
  
Baruah, Sanjib. "Routine Emergencies: India's Armed Forces Special Powers Act." In Civil War 
and Sovereignty in South Asia: Regional and Political Economy Perspectives, edited by 
Aparna Sundar and Nandini Sundar. New Delhi: Sage, 2014. 
  
Baud, Michiel, and Willem van Schendel. "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands." 
Journal of World History 8, no. 2 (Fall 1997). 
  
Behera, Navnita Chadha. Demystifying Kashmir. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006. 
  
Bennigsen, Alexandre. "Colonization and Decolonization in the Soviet Union." Journal of 
Contemporary History 4, no. 1 (January 1969). 
  
Betts, Raymond. Decolonization. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 
  
Bose, Sumantra. Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. 
N.p.: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
  
Bradnock, Robert. "Counting in Kashmir." The World Today 66, no. 6 (June 2010). 
	   90 
  
Brock, Lothar, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Sorenson, and Michael Stohl. Fragile States: Violence 
and the Future of Intervention. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012. 
  
Brysk, Alison, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz. "After Empire: National Identity and 
PostColonial Families of Nations." European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2 
(2002). 
  
Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993. 
  
Chernetsky, Vitaly. "Postcolonialism, Russia and Ukrane." Ulbandus Review 7 (2003). 
  
Chiari, P.R. "Sources of New Delhi's Kashmir Policy." In Kashmir: New Voices, New 
Approaches, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii, 117. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 
  
Chowdhary, Rekha. "Modi’s roadmap for India’s Kashmir and Pakistan policies." East Asia 




Datta, Rekha. Beyond Realism: Human Security in India and Pakistan in the Twenty-First 
Century. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008. 
  
Gerovitch, Slava. "“New Soviet Man” Inside Machine: Human Engineering, Spacecraft Design, 
and the Construction of Communism." Osiris, no. 22 (2007). 
  
GPD. "Early Chill in Kashmir?" Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 48 
(November/December 2004). 
  
Havdiak, Iryna, and Artur Inderike. "Timeline." In The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and 
Foreign Intervention, edited by Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2014. 
  
"India Revises Kashmir Death Toll to 47,000." Reuters. Last modified November 21, 2008. 
Accessed April 26, 2015. http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/21/idINIndia-
36624520081121. 
  
"India: Urgent investigation needed as protests continue in Kashmir." Amnesty International. 




 Intrastate Conflict by the Numbers. Last modified February 4, 2013. Accessed November 28, 
2014. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-








Kaganovsky, Lilya. "How the Soviet Man Was (Un)Made." Slavic Review 63, no. 3 (Fall 2004). 
  
Kak, Shakti. "The Agrarian System of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir." In India's 
Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism, edited by Waltraud Ernst and 
Biswamoy Pati. London, UK: Routledge, 2007. 
  
Kang, David. "Acute Conflicts in Asia after the Cold War." In Asian Security Order: 
Instrumental and Normative Features, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 367. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003. 
  
"Kashmir villagers flee amid India Pakistan cross-border fire." Deutsche Welle. Last modified 
January 6, 2015. Accessed April 19, 2015. http://www.dw.de/kashmir-villagers-flee-
amid-india-pakistan-cross-border-fire/a-18172651. 
  
Khrushchev, Nikita S. The National Liberation Movement. Moscow, USSR: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1963. 
  
Kohn, Margaret, and Keally McBride. Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism and 
the Problem of Foundations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
  




Kravchenko, Valery V. "?????????-?????????? ????? 2014 ?.: ???????, ????????, ????????." 
Working paper, Donetsk National University, 2015. 
  
Kuzio, Taras. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism: New Directions in 
Cross-Cultural and Post-Communist States. Stuttgart, DE: Ibidem, 2014. 
  
———. Ukrainian Security Policy. N.p.: Praeger, 1995. 
  
 Line of Actual Control: China and India Again Squabbling over Disputed Himalayan Border. 
Last modified May 3, 2013. Accessed November 26, 2014. http://www.ibtimes.com/line-
actual-control-china-india-again-squabbling-over-disputed-himalayan-border-1236401. 
  
Mearsheimer, John J. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault." Foreign Affairs. Accessed 
April 19, 2015. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-
the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault. 
	   92 
  
Molchanov, Mikhail A. "Borders of Identity: Ukraine's Political and Cultural Significance for 
Russia." Canadian Slavonic Papers 38, no. 1/2 (March-June 1996). 
  
Nehru, Jawaharlal. On Communalism. N.p.: Hope India, 2006. 
  
Paris, Roland. "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security 26, no. 2 
(Fall 2001): 87. 
  
"People, princes and colonialism." Introduction to India's Princely States: People, Princes and 
Colonialsm, edited by Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati. London, UK: Routledge, 
2007. 
  
"Plebiscite in Kashmir." Kashmir Library. Accessed April 18, 2015. 
http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_chapters/plebiscite.shtml. 
  
Raza, Maroof. Wars and No Peace over Kashmir. N.p.: Lancer, 1996. 
  
Riabchuk, Mykola. "Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why Ukraine Is Trapped between East and 
West." In Ukraine, the EU and Russia, edited by Stephen Velychenko. New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
  
———. "Culture and Cultural Politics in Ukraine: A Postcolonial Perspective." In Dilemmas of 
State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine, edited by Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri. 
Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 
  
———. "Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and postcommunist transition." 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 45 (August 2012). 
  
Samii, Cyrus. "Kashmir: From Persistence to Progress?" In Kashmir: New Voices, New 
Approaches, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. 
  
Shkandrij, Myroslav. "Subverting Leviathan." In Russia and Ukraine: Literature and the 
Discourse of Empire from Napoleonic to Postcolonial Times. Montreal, CA: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2001. 
  
Shulman, Stephen. "The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National 
Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration." In Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in 
Ukraine, edited by Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri. Wesport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 
  
 Simla Agreement. Last modified July 2, 1972. Accessed November 26, 2014. 
http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5541/Simla+Agreement. 
  
	   93 
Singh Sidhu, Waheguru Pal. "Introduction." Introduction to Kashmir: New Voices, New 
Approaches, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii, 1-9. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 
  
Taras, Ray, Olga Filippova, and Nelly Pobeda. "Ukraine's Transnationals, Far-Away Locals, and 
Xenophobes: Prospects for Europeanness." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (September 
2004). 
  
———. "Ukraine's Transnationals, Far-Away Locals, and Xenophobes: The Prospects for 
Europeanness." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (September 2004). 
  
"Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad." Washington Post. Last 





"Ukraine ceasefire: New Minsk agreement key points." BBC News. Last modified February 12, 
2015. Accessed April 19, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513. 
  
United Nations Development Programme. 1994 Human Development Report. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
  
Varshney, Ashutosh. "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem." 
In Ethnonationalism in India, edited by Sanjib Baruah. New Delhi, India: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
  
White, Stephen, and Valentina Feklyunina. Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014. 
  
Wilson, Andrew. Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2014. 
  
Win, Thin Lei. "Ukraine Is the 'Kashmir' of Europe." Reuters. Last modified October 22, 2014. 
Accessed April 19, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-
2803760/Ukraine-Kashmir-Europe--Russia-expert.html. 
  
Zaidi, S.H. "The Intractable Kashmir Issue: Search for a Rational Solution." Pakistan Horizon 
56, no. 2 (April 2003): 53-85. 
  
 
